



**CHALLENGES TO BE ADDRESSED IN
ORDER TO GIVE THE SOCIAL SECTOR
EPWP MOMENTUM**

EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME REPORT

21 November 2005

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1 INTRODUCTION

In February this year, the President addressed the Second Joint sitting of Parliament and stressed the need to make aggressive interventions in the second economy. He spoke about the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) being a key mechanism for doing so because of its focus on the provision of training, work experience and temporary income to women and the youth. The Early Childhood Development (ECD) programme and the Home Community Based Care (HCBC) programme were mentioned in the speech as two key programmes that should be used as vehicles for expansion of jobs in the social sector. The emphasis is on re-orientating line function budgets and conditional grants so that governmental expenditure results in more work opportunities for unskilled labour, while at the same time improving the quality of service and meeting basic community needs. (Action Plan pp 9 and 10)

Again in July this year, at the Briefing on the Cabinet Lekgotla, the President brought up the programme saying that by May 2005 at least 223 400 gross work opportunities had been created. He was talking mainly about progress in the infrastructure sector but he did raise the social sector too and mentioned the Early Childhood Development programme saying that detailed plans on this programme would be presented to Cabinet soon. He said that resources would be allocated to speed up implementation of this programme as well as the HCBC programme and he stipulated that he wanted to see the social sector programme being scaled up.

The attention given to Social Sector EPWP by the President is an indicator of a substantial and growing commitment to it at the summit of the political pyramid. It has been recognised that a great opportunity exists in the sector to improve services and expand work opportunities amongst some of the poorest members of the community. The programme is seen as quite distinct from the creation of jobs in the formal economy and its expansion, it is argued, must take place outside of the formal labour market conditions that existing employed workers occupy.

Perhaps it should also be said that what is unusual about the Social Sector EPWP is that it is the first time that a public works programme has been designed around activities that are usually done by women for free, or by volunteers or women at very low wages. This will have implications for wage levels, for voluntarism, for people's understanding for the programme and commitment to it.

The extension of the EPWP to the social sector started in earnest in 2004 after Cabinet adopted the EPWP Social Sector Plan. We have summarised this plan and a subsequent attempt to lend operational detail to it (the Action Plan) in Annexures 1 and 2. We hope that this will be helpful to those who have not yet had an opportunity to read either the Social Sector plan or the Action Plan.

2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Our Brief

It should be noted at the outset that our brief is not to develop a plan of action for accelerating the delivery of the Social Sector Plan. Instead our brief is to try to understand what it is that is holding up the process of moving the Social Sector Plan Forward. As such our investigation has been analytical in nature and whilst we have not been asked to chart a way forward, our analysis is strongly suggestive of such a way. Moreover in the final Section of the report we do make explicit recommendations for action.

2.2 Methodology

Because of its investigative nature it was accepted at the outset that it was difficult to develop a methodological blueprint for the study. In short it was recognised that as important insights/leads were unearthed so it would be necessary to follow them up. This recognition notwithstanding we attempted to give structure to the investigation via two methods. Firstly we developed a set of hypotheses (based on prior experience in comparable contexts) as to what could be impeding progress in the implementation of the Social Sector Plan. We then set out to explore and investigate these hypotheses.

Secondly we sketched out the entire process necessary to implement the Social Sector Plan from top to bottom (using the Social Sector Plan and the Action Plan as key inputs) with a view to ensuring that we conducted our investigation across the entire delivery process. Thus we made certain that we spoke to informants at all implementation levels – at national level, at provincial level, at local authority level, in the SETAS, in NPO's involved as service providers of training, and in NPO's involved as providers of HCBC and ECD services . We also interviewed key players involved in thinking through the implementation process and others knowledgeable about various areas of the programme. At a material level the investigation took the form of workshops, interviews and meetings; a review of documents and papers and several brainstorming sessions. (See Annexures 3, 4 and 5 which provide lists of people interviewed, meetings attended and documents used).

2.3 Hypotheses

As noted above we identified five hypotheses around which we proposed to structure our work. After some initial interviews we assessed the extent to which each of the hypotheses applied or whether new hypotheses need to be introduced. The five hypotheses initially identified were:

1. Non delivery stems from unresolved policy issues.
2. Non delivery stems from a lack of programme management and project management capacity in the relevant departments
3. Non-delivery stems from a lack of political or technical leadership capacity in the lead department and other key departments.
4. Lack of progress stems from lack of commitment or even open /surreptitious opposition to the Sector Plan on the part of key players (officials and politicians)
5. Non delivery stems from the overly complex conceptualization of the Sector Plan and particularly the requirements of cross-departmental and intergovernmental co-ordination and

co-operation. Further complexity is added by the linking of the programme to a complex training and accreditation machinery.

Our initial investigations suggested that many of the challenges being experienced in getting the programme moving could be classified under the hypotheses listed above. What the initial investigations did was to give content the hypotheses and to suggest several sub-hypotheses. Modifications to existing hypotheses were required and one new hypothesis was added.

2.4 6th Hypothesis - Funding

Dealing with the issue of the new hypothesis first, the team was of the view that the following hypothesis needed to be added as hypothesis 6:

“Funding and differing perceptions about its availability in both the short and the long term is an issue affecting the implementation of the Social Sector Plan. Whilst additional funding is in principle available many of the key actors do not immediately have access to funds which allow them to mobilise the resources necessary to properly kick-start the process. Moreover certain key components of the programme may not be adequately funded”.

In the TOR for the investigation there was a suggestion that given various political commitments (most particularly by the Presidency), the availability of funding was not an issue. In fact it was implied that it was somewhat paradoxical that funds were available but little action was being observed with respect to getting the programme going. We realised that the issue of funding was indeed important particularly issues of immediate availability of funding and recognition that not all of the key players are convinced that funds will flow in their direction.

As we progressed through the meetings and interviews we began to expand on, refine and work beyond the original six hypotheses. While these hypotheses guided the earlier questions we asked, as time went on we began to hone in on other key issues. As a result, our main findings are set out under new headings (and in order of importance) below. However, although the material is organised under slightly different headings, we do in fact address the six hypotheses. In the sections below we will refer to these hypotheses where relevant. It should be noted however that we are nonetheless of the view that there are some issues which are more important than those we originally set out to explore. For instance we believe that confusion over implementation arrangements for coordination, driving and support of the programme is absolutely central to understand the slow start to the programme. This became apparent to us only after our many discussions with key players – and was certainly not something we could see in the earlier months of the research.

3 MAIN FINDINGS

Our main findings are set out below. As noted above perhaps our most important finding is that there are major problems with implementation arrangements for the EPWP programme in the social sector. More specifically a central observation of our study is that there is confusion amongst key players about three different, but very important activities in the programme implementation of a multi-sector, multi-actor and multi-level programmes. These are processes of driving, co-ordination and support. A major observation is that many of the institutional arrangements set up to date are either structured for co-ordination or support rather than driving. Moreover we reach the conclusion that structures for driving are inadequately developed.

Another of our key findings, which is one that was identified in the Action Plan document as well, but perhaps not explored in much detail there, is that capacity problems at all levels continue to hamper delivery. It becomes clichéd and repetitive to keep belabouring this point – about capacity weaknesses – but we have tried to make our points as specific as we can and say more than that there are weaknesses. We have tried to identify and prioritize shortcomings to be overcome.

Something that the Action Plan does not specifically refer to, but which we have certainly found to be an issue, is to fully embrace the reality and importance of the context of decentralization. This amongst other things has implications for the leadership of the programme and for the arrangements for implementation. As far as leadership is concerned it raises the issue of whether leadership should be addressed top-down or bottom-up. As far as implementation arrangements are concerned we have reached the conclusion that the Social Sector EPWP does not really address the kinds of arrangements (driving and accountability) that are necessary to make decentralised delivery possible. Our investigation has also revealed that many initiatives that are working have a strong localised or bottom-up thrust. Where capacity, energy and strength exists in key players in the municipalities, NGOs, CBOs and provinces, and a combination of these can creatively be put together, progress is being made in implementing the Social Sector Plan.

Buy-in and identification with the programme is also something we have placed a fair measure of emphasis on, as all indications are that buy-in is still limited. The reason for this is complex involving lack of information, rivalry, misunderstanding and lack of implementation experience.

These and other main findings are presented below. As noted above they are presented as a set of key issues, rather than being discussed in relation to the six hypotheses that structured our work at the outset.

3.1 Implementation Arrangements

Coordination, driving and support

We found in our investigation, that there is confusion over and conflation of three implementation activities.

- Coordination
- Driving
- Support

We found that officials themselves were often not sure which role they were playing or were meant to play. And it seemed to us, as we progressed with our meetings and interviews, that clarity on this issue would go a long way to allowing roles to become more clearly defined. And essentially, we believe that unless roles are spelt out, for all players at all levels, and everyone knows what it is they should be doing, it is unlikely that the programme will roll out with much success.

In order to be clear it is important that we clearly define our understanding of the three activities referred to above.

- **Co-ordination**

Co-ordination in essence refers to horizontal relations between line functions. Since the advent of the RDP, such horizontal co-ordination has been stressed in government (sometimes to the detriment of driving) in order to achieve more integrated delivery of public goods and services. Such integration is generally considered necessary in order to fully and efficiently realise the range of outputs that government can make given limited resources (inputs). More crucially however integration is necessary to help ensure that government moves away from “silo-driven-delivery” (where what gets delivered is what was delivered last year plus 10%) to outcomes-driven delivery (where what gets delivered is dictated by assessments of the outputs that will most likely move society towards defined and desired outcomes).

Co-ordination in government generally refers to a range of activities. Firstly there is co-ordination with respect to policy (this often the most important form of co-ordination since if policy is properly formulated the need to co-ordinate implementation can be drastically reduced). Secondly there is co-ordination with respect to funding. This in turn has several dimensions. First there is co-ordination and prioritisation of line function capital budgets. Secondly there is co-ordination and synchronisation of operating budgets and routine operations (often overlooked). Finally there is co-ordination of the sequencing and form of implementation activities.

There are substantial transaction costs associated with co-ordination and it is, as a consequence, important to not undertake co-ordination just for the sake of it. As a general rule processes that are properly planned up-front can reduce the need for co-ordination down the line precisely because line functions can (to a large extent) operate vertically if the up-front game-plan has been co-ordinated (for example we can drive a very long way without ever having to co-ordinate activities as long as we all agree up-front to drive on the left hand side of the road). In the same vein a further general rule is that because it is difficult for line functions to work horizontally, co-ordination should be thought about carefully and reduced to a minimum.

- **Driving**

Driving refers to processes which have the primary goal of achieving delivery (of outputs). Whereas co-ordination is generally a horizontal process (across line functions) driving is almost always a vertical process (within line function). As a general rule line functions are designed to operate vertically (and the term line implies vertical hierarchy). Crucial to the notion of driving are accountability and authority. If effective driving is to be achieved key actors have to be given responsibility for achieving delivery and must be held accountable for their performance in this regard. Those responsible for delivery must be accorded authority commensurate with responsibility. And those watching over the deliverers must have the authority to demand accountability. When line functions work horizontally across the silos, problems of responsibility and authority can undermine delivery.

It is important to realise that processes of driving and co-ordination are different and even potentially contradictory. The literature suggests two ways (in theory) to substantially reduce these contradictions. The first is to make one of the line functions the “owner of the process”. This can be achieved in a strong form and a weak form. In the strong form the process owner (a single line function) is given the full budget for a programme (requiring integrated delivery) and then orders outputs from other line functions. In the weak form a single line function is designated as the lead department but it has no budget control. In such situations there is often a big gap between authority and responsibility. In between these polar cases there are several intermediate positions (for example process owners could be given additional budget to use as leverage). The second way to reduce the tension between driving and co-ordination is to manage outcomes achievement through area-based institutional structures (again there is a weak form and a strong form). Perhaps the problem is that the line function department that is meant to drive, is not incentivised to do so.

- **Support**

Support is in essence a facilitation function and can take many forms. As a general rule it involves taking little direct responsibility for delivery and at the same time generally requires (and is accorded) little authority. Facilitator inputs can be absolutely crucial to both co-ordination and delivery. There is however a general tendency for players involved in support to either assume or be perceived as assuming the driving role. Whilst this can work in certain contexts, as a general rule the support function support should never drive. It can sometimes be effective in organizing co-ordination however.

When one looks at the Social Sector Plan in terms of the conceptual framework set out above, there are several points that can be made. We start with those of a more general nature and proceed to the more specific.

- **Confusion over Roles**

As previously noted there appears to be substantial confusion over these three kinds of activities particularly in the minds of key players (which is also reflected in their actions). Confusion over who drives the programme as a whole is a useful example. When we interviewed people at Provincial level as to who was driving the process and who they felt accountable to, the answers were split between DPW and DSD. In part this is because in some quarters the EPWP (including the Social Sector Plan is considered to be owned by DPW). It is also in large part due to the fact that in practice there are two individuals (one in DPW and one in DSD) who notwithstanding the fact that their structural role is support and notwithstanding the fact that they have no structural implementation authority, are in fact giving the process impetus,

The confusion over the three kinds of activities was also quite evident when we interviewed provincial co-ordinators and asked them about their own roles. Whilst some saw their role as facilitation and co-ordination many saw themselves as the official in the province with the responsibility to ensure that the Social Sector Plan is implemented. They were less sure about who they saw themselves directly accountable to. Many did show an understanding of the structural limitations of their roles bemoaning the difficulties they had in mobilising other line functions into action. . For instance we were told by provincial co-ordinators that it is difficult to get people from the line function departments who have been designated for the EPWP, to meetings. This is partly because they do not report to the co-ordinators, and in fact are mostly more senior. Moreover the co-ordinators have no authority to obtain their attendance. There was also substantial reference to problems with the provincial steering committees that are meant to coordinate the implementation of the EPWP. For example different people attend each meeting and there is little continuity. This problem was specifically mentioned in respect to the Northern


Cape and the Western Cape (although the Western Cape appears to have appointed a fairly senior official from Public Works to coordinate who is seen to be “a political driver”).

It should be noted that in the Social Sector Plan itself it is recognised that driving is a vertical process largely to be executed through the line functions in terms of normal operational procedures. In the document there is a clear separation of what are called institutional arrangements from implementation arrangements See Figure 1. The same distinction is maintained in the new set of arrangements recently proposed. Precisely how to give impetus to this in the context of substantial decentralization is however not clearly spelled out in any of the Social Sector Plan documents. We will return to this issue later in this section.

- **Institutional Arrangements for driving the Programme**

Figure 1 and Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c below summarise the institutional and implementation arrangements for the programme as initially envisaged in the 2004 Social Sector Plan.

It should be noted that the institutional arrangements originally envisaged for the project have been largely “co-ordinating arrangements” to deal with horizontal interaction. In fact very few arrangements have been made specifically to deal with driving. This is partly due to the fact that there is an assumption that driving will happen via normal line function arrangements and partly because there is an assumption that the co-ordinating structures that have been set up do have roles in driving the process. In our view if the Social Sector EPWP is to develop momentum then special arrangements do have to be made for the vertical driving of the programme.



Implementation arrangements




Figure 1: Initial Institutional Arrangements.

Figure 2a : Institutional Arrangements: National – Policy and programme management




Figure 2b. Institutional arrangements: Provincial – Policy and programme management





Figure 2c. **Institutional Arrangements: Implementation**



If the EPWP is to have the status of a programme of special importance, it is our opinion that it requires special measures to ensure its success. To take the view that it will be business as usual when it comes to implementation simply will not do. Special measures have to be in place to ensure that the programme is “driven”. It is not our brief to produce an action plan in this regard, or to specify what precisely might these measures be, but a few points are particularly pertinent.

Experience in multi-sectoral “special” presidential projects such as the so-called SIPP programme, has revealed that it is particularly important to ensure that accountability arrangements are clearly in place if line functions are to perform both with respect to delivering outputs but also in respect of the timing and sequencing of such outputs.

One such multi-sectoral SIPP project was the large urban renewal project undertaken in Cato Manor in Durban. Here a great deal was learned about how to organize accountability relations. In the Cato Manor project it initially proved very difficult for the area based team managing the overall project to ensure that line functions delivered in accordance with an agreed delivery programme. The area manager’s problems arose in large part from the fact that they had no line authority over the line departments of both the Province (KZN) and the City (Ethekwini). It was only when proper accountability arrangements were put in place that the project developed momentum and began to deliver on programmed targets.

More specifically an overarching “Cato Manor Management Committee” was put in place which was made up of the DG of the Province (or his or her nominee) and the City Manager (or his or her nominee). Particularly important was the fact that these officials had the muscle to demand performance from the line functions. The procedure followed was that the Committee met once a month and at each meeting the area manager of the Cato Manor Project reported on progress

against programme. If line functions were lagging they could immediately be called to account in this regard. This special arrangement certainly worked. Moreover the regular review of progress by senior officials (as opposed to looking at scorecards at the end of the year) proved to be very important.

In our view appropriate accountability structures are not in place in the Social Sector EPWP. In fact the key drivers of the process have not been clearly identified let alone the establishment of structures to ensure their ongoing accountability (we will return the question of the drivers later in the context of a discussion of the implications of decentralization for implementation arrangements). As far as accountability structures are concerned however it is clear that no particular structures have been put in place to ensure that provincial line function departments deliver. The same can be said about local authorities and relevant local authority line functions. Nor have arrangements been put in place to ensure that the SETAS can be held accountable (on a regular basis) for the outputs that they are expected to deliver. And of course the same is true of the various NPO's and there are questions of course of whether and how they can be held accountable.

In discussions with line function officials in the various provinces (who in our view were in key driving roles) we could find no instance of where performance on the Social Sector EPWP had been written into the annual key performance indicators for those officials. In fact a number of these officials were unaware of the fact that they are key drivers.

Perhaps too, it should be noted that many of the skills one finds in a department, such as DSD, are 'soft' skills. A great many social workers, for instance are employed, whose training is to counsel and facilitate in the 'soft' sense. They do not have proactive, driving skills nor hard business skills. Social work principles – to empathise, understand, listen, suppress one's own ego needs, are not necessarily useful skills in the managing of projects.

It should be noted that the establishment of the new institutional structures for the project (as depicted in Figs 1, 2a, 2b, and 2c above) has actually had the unintended impact of making accountability relationships more murky

Officials we spoke to in the different line departments account to their superiors who account to theirs, and so forth. So when an initiative comes along that requires them to possibly account to a committee or to someone in another department, confusion, resentment or inactivity may be the outcome. Any institutional arrangement that involves the meeting of officials from more than one department has to be vested with authority by the most senior officials of the line departments – whether it be at provincial or national level. As noted above officials see their performance being monitored and overseen by their line function superiors. It seems that there is a tendency among officials to shrug of responsibility for implementing the EPWP programme because the instructions to do so are not emanating from the superiors to whom officials report.

- **Decentralisation and implementation arrangements**

As previously noted it is crucial to grasp the implications of a substantial government decentralisation drive for implementation arrangements. In particular it is important to note that it is not necessarily that straightforward to drive a special national programme in the context of strong decentralization policies and practices. Particularly important to note in this regard is the increasingly strong decentralisation of the expenditure function in government. At present there are two forms of financial transfers from national to provincial governments and local authorities. The first is the concept of a formula based equitable share that once transferred is fully utilised and accounted for by provinces themselves. In short provinces do not have to account to national for the deployment and use of these funds. National priorities are of course

communicated and discussed by the President with the Premiers of the provinces, but it is up to the Premiers to decide what emphasis they want to give to these priorities.

The second type of transfer mechanism is the so-called conditional grant. As its name implies the conditional grant comes with strings attached and allows for a greater degree of “centralised driving”. However in the past few years government (and particularly treasury) have expressed the intention of reducing the use of conditional grants. According to our sources in treasury the reason for this has partly to do with a commitment to decentralisation. More important however is the experience of treasury with conditional grants. In short the experience is that money allocated to provinces in the form of conditional grants is often not used (mainly because of the lack of provincial commitment to a centrally defined programme). The current position in treasury is that conditional grants should be used for a short period only, primarily with a view to kick-starting programmes of national priority. However the view is that as soon as possible funding should revert to the equitable share route.

It seems then that whilst a degree of central driving is possible, the dominant reality for the Social Sector EPWP is a context of decentralization. This has very important implications which we do not feel have been sufficiently recognised in current implementation arrangements. To begin with it implies that the programme has many drivers rather than one or two central drivers. It is not clear to us that these drivers have been identified sufficiently clearly. In fact it is not clear to us that these decentrally-located drivers are themselves aware of the fact that they are key drivers and that they are being held accountable in this regard.

Moreover it is important to realise that the Director General's of national line function departments have limited capacity to “crack-the-whip” with respect to overseeing and driving programmes at the provincial level. It is probably more appropriate for the DG's of the provinces and the Heads of Departments of the provinces to play this role. In event accountability structures have to be developed which reflect the reality of substantial decentralization. It is also crucial of course that there should be “ownership” of the programme by provincial politicians and officials. We will return to this point in a later section.

- **Co-ordination and delivery.**

This sub-section does not try to address the full range of issues around the co-ordination of complex national programmes. Our main concern is with how to give the Social Sector EPWP momentum. Thus our interest here is not in co-ordination per se but with the extent to which it either contributes to or detracts from the achievement of this momentum.

As previously noted many of the special institutional structures that have been set up for the programme are co-ordination rather than driving structures. This reflects the contemporary emphasis in government on improving horizontal relations (across line functions). These structures have been quite successful in delivering on integrated policy formulation but not with respect to driving delivery. In the sub-section above we have endeavoured to make the point that the emphasis on co-ordination has sometimes come at the cost of arrangements for driving. Given that the integration of policy has already been achieved it does not necessarily make sense to reproduce national institutional arrangements in the provinces as is proposed in the institutional arrangements for the programme (both the initial arrangements and those proposed for the future).

It is however very important to recognise that whilst processes of co-ordination and driving are conceptually and operationally distinct, there is a strong inter-relation between them. Some forms of co-ordination are necessary for effective driving. However the institutional arrangements described in Figures 1, 2a, 2b and 2c above do not explicitly deal with these interconnections. As

previously noted one way to bring co-ordination and driving into closer accord is to assign the role of “process owner” to one of the line functions. In the Social Sector EPWP this role has been assigned to DSD. It should be stressed however that the form of process ownership varies between very strong forms and very weak forms. In the strong forms process owners are empowered by giving them control over the entire budget for the programme and they then order outputs from other line functions when and if they need them. In the weakest forms the process owners have no budget leverage at all and are expected to “lead” the process by persuasion. Between these extremes there are several possibilities. In the Social Sector EPWP, DSD have been accorded the weakest form of process ownership. In our view thought should be given to strengthening DSD’s (as process owner) leverage.

In thinking about the way forward an important starting point should be a clear identification of what needs to be co-ordinated in future (especially with respect to driving). The question needs to be asked whether current and planned institutional structures are appropriate. Experience elsewhere has shown that co-ordination processes should be infrequent and content-filled. Very important is the making of arrangements up-front that allow line functions to then continue with business as usual (the analogy of the decision to drive on the left hand side of the road is apt again—if we decide to do this we can drive a long way without having to talk to each other again). Of course a degree of ongoing co-ordination is necessary but it is a question of emphasis and in our view the building of institutional arrangements should at this stage of the process be dictated by concerns of mobilisation and driving rather than concerns of co-ordination.

At national level periodic co-ordination will be necessary to inter alia address policy amendments/parameters, to develop strategies for effectively bidding for money with treasury, and to oversee the broad measurement of the outcomes of the programme and report these to cabinet. At provincial level co-ordination will be important initially for information transmission and to achieve buy-in, to strategise about the content and form of presentation of provincial business plans, to set base agreements for implementation and occasionally to co-ordinate the sequencing of implementation. Beyond making provision for these requirements, the arrangements for implementation should (as noted above) be dictated by the logic of driving in the future.

- **Support**

Some of the confusion around roles in the programme derives from a failure to clearly identify a support role/function and to distinguish it from processes of driving and co-ordination. Thus as has been mentioned previously the role of DPW (which is essentially support) is often misunderstood (and interpreted as driving).

It should be noted too that in its weak process owner role, DSD also plays a facilitation and support function and there is potential for role conflict between the two departments. At present there appears to be no difficulty in this regard with the support functions in DPW and DSD working very well together. In fact the impetus that the programme currently has is in large measure due to the co-ordinated efforts of these actors. It is suggested however that in future thought be given to clear designation of the areas of support that each department undertakes. In our view DPW’s support will be particularly crucial in enhancing the programme and project management capacities of line function managers at all levels but particularly in the provinces. DSD’s focus might be the mobilisation of players at all levels and for managing the national provincial interface.

It is also very important in our view that DPW ‘s support mandate is very clearly communicated to all role players.

3.2 Political and Technical Leadership

In our discussion with key informants no one has intimated that important politicians are opposed to the plan. In fact it seems that there is good support from politicians and from the line Ministries concerned. Apparently the Minister of Health has concerns about too many different kinds of community workers involved in various forms of community based care. But this does not mean that she does not support the Social Sector Plan. Whether or not the various Ministers have been sufficiently active in championing the initiative and demanding delivery is more debatable. Thus whilst we have not heard of any active political opposition, we have not heard of outstanding support either. Leadership by provincial politicians is also very low key. When we explored this issue with provincial co-ordinators of the Social Sector EPWP we obtained a variety of responses. Some co-ordinators reported that there was active support and enthusiasm from pertinent MEC's, whilst others indicated that at a provincial level there was hardly any awareness amongst politicians let alone leadership.

As far as leadership by officials is concerned a number of informants have suggested that because the implementation process from the centre has lost momentum it will be necessary for the DGs in the social sector departments to take a strong hand in getting the process back on track again. One informant noted that the coordinating department in the social sector, DSD was meant to lead implementation of the EPWP in the social cluster. And the understanding was that the DGs of the three departments were to meet regularly to review progress. We were told that whilst the DG's met via the DG's the National Social Sector Forum, their meetings addressed a range of issues and the Social Sector EPWP was only periodically on their agenda (and it was implied that the priority given to it was quite low). The same informant suggested that the individual departments have done little because they are waiting for the co-coordinating department (DSD) to tell them what to do. The co-ordination department he suggested had done little because there is no dedicated capacity and because there is little direction from the DGs

There are also some leadership issues at national departmental level as is evidenced by competition between HCBC initiatives emanating from different sub-departments in the Department of Health. Trying to marry HCBC initiatives across departments is hard enough. Thus interdepartmental competition within the same line function is really problematic. Moreover the Social Sector EPWP can impose an onerous set of tasks on a department which are often seen as an extra burden rather than providing a way of achieving core objectives.

In recent months however there has however been a flurry of activity from the centre and this is beginning to yield results. In the time (3 months) that we have been involved in this investigation we have noted a marked increase in activity in support of the programme from the centre. Dedicated capacity has been created in DSD with good access to the DG DSD. The proposed new institutional arrangements for the project (see figures 2a, 2b and 2c) are one result of the injection of energy that the assignment of dedicated capacity has had. Moreover a number of meetings with the Provinces have been held aimed at improving communication and understanding of the programme. There has also been a concerted drive to give impetus to the business planning process at provincial level (the support of the Business Trust has been engaged here).

There is also a growing recognition from the DG's themselves that whilst energy from the centre was important, the Social Sector EPWP could not be driven from the centre (because of decentralization and particularly the way funding worked). This is a very important development as it seems that there has been an expectation (misplaced in our view) that the EPWP both could and should be driven from the centre. In fact leadership from politicians and officials in the Provinces is more likely to be determining of the success or failure of the programme. We turn as a consequence to an assessment of leadership and activity at the provincial level.

Progress in implementing the Social Sector Plan in the Provinces is uneven but it is fair to say that overall progress has been slow. However an increased momentum towards delivery has been observable in the last few months in some provinces. And some (three) have already developed business plans. More recently (over the past two months) substantial efforts (supported by the Business Trust) are being made to ensure that business plans are indeed produced for each of the provinces. Such efforts are in our view precisely the kinds of inputs that are necessary. In recent months DSD has also appointed provincial co-ordinators in each of the provinces—and has begun a process of briefing them. It should be noted however that provincial co-ordinators are not and cannot be the leaders of the programme in the provinces (their role is co-ordination and support).

The progress noted above notwithstanding it is important to acknowledge that much has yet to be done including inter alia the following :

- In many provinces there is still no buy-in to (in fact there is little knowledge of) the Social Sector EPWP on the part of key politicians and officials. Thus those who should in fact be providing the most crucial leadership have yet to be mobilised into action
- Intended institutional structures have not been set up in most provinces (it should be stressed that we are not entirely convinced that the proposed institutional structures (figs 2a, b and c) are in fact the appropriate). Careful thought has to be given to who the drivers are in fact and special attention has to be given to the design of appropriate accountability structures.
- Local authorities have not been mobilised (notwithstanding the fact that they are mentioned in the Social Sector Plan) and they have an important role to play. Some local authorities have chosen to take the bull by the horns and have developed promising ECD and HCBC initiatives despite having not been mobilised by the provinces. We spoke to both Msunduzi and Ethekwini about impressive initiatives that they have got off the ground and it was apparent to us that they were both willing and able to play a much more active role.
- At a national level there are intergovernmental coordination structures such as the Minmeecs. The IGR Bill proposes similar structures for provincial and municipal levels. These institutions are essentially political bodies that aim to coordinate activities within line functions between spheres. In other words they enhance vertical coordination. Structures of this kind could be used align provincial and local government effort.
- We do not see that a concerted effort has been made to get bottom up impetus. This point must be read together with our concern about buy-in and communication. Without successful communication of the programme, and attempting to obtain buy-in from the various levels of government it is hard to expect bottom up impetus. And of course there needs to be guidelines and an implementation plan that players at all levels can use to assist them in implementation.
- Insufficient attention is being given to the active mobilisation of NPO service providers in the province

In thinking about bottom-up approaches to leadership and driving it should be noted that capacity in the NPO sector is very uneven. However there does appear to be ample evidence of the creative role NPO's can play if appropriately mobilised. The Centre for Early Childhood Development in Cape Town, an NGO that provides training to ECD practitioners was approached by the DSD Western Cape to train people at Level 1 and Level 4 on an urgent basis. It seems that the department had some funding that had to be spent by the end of the 2005 financial year and had no capacity to organise learnerships itself, in time. The Centre got the job done. The example illustrates that where capacity shortages are acute in government, the use of

existing capacity in the NGO sector, and the honing in on existing initiatives that are already under way, and which can really only be identified from the bottom, is one way of speeding up implementation.

Another model, that also involved the Centre for Early Childhood Development is instructive. Here the Centre was paid a management fee for ensuring that learners selected for a training programme, with an identified service provider, were paid their stipends. The funding was to be paid by the SETA to the NGO who in turn made payments to a number of CBOs who employed the learners and who were responsible for paying the learners the stipend. To facilitate the process, contracts were signed between the CBOs and the Centre for Early Childhood Development and were used to ensure that the CBO released the stipend to the learner. The Centre was paid a 6% management fee for performing this task. The example demonstrates that if capacity is limited within government to monitor how money is spent, the use of a well-resourced NGO to undertake part of the work of getting the stipend paid and the training undertaken can enhance successful implementation. It seemed quite clear to us in our discussions with a variety of NPO's that there is much creativity and leadership capacity in the NPO sector. Although, this must be tempered by scepticism in the sector and a low level of buy-in .

In conclusion it is worth noting that at the outset we operated with a pre-conception that a programme driven energetically from the centre was what was needed to achieve the President's desire to see the Social Sector EPWP take off. This implied support to the driving apparatuses which we saw as located at the centre (the DG's Forum etc). **On reflection we think the programme is much more likely to work if supported and led from the bottom. Ideally the kind of situation that should be created is one in which there is a welter of initiative from the bottom putting pressure on the centre to provide needed resources.**

3.3 Critical Path Planning

A fairly striking feature of the Social Sector Plan implementation process to date is the absence of critical path planning. In short at both national and provincial level, there are no critical path plans highlighting the sequencing of actions and more importantly identifying and sequencing "critical actions". Such critical actions either leverage or catalyze other actions or are actions upon which a multitude of other actions are contingent. A consequence of this lack of critical path planning is that much energy may be spent on relatively unimportant actions whilst conjuncturally very important issues are ignored. Thus significant opportunities may be lost. An example is the failure to meet deadlines regarding the submission of budget proposals to treasury (an example which has some resonance for the Social Sector EPWP). The knock-on effects of such omissions may be very substantial.

In our view critical path planning for the Social Sector EPWP at both national and provincial level should be undertaken as a matter of urgency

3.4 Dedicated Kick Starting Capacity

At all levels of government our attention was drawn to difficulties associated with kick-starting the Social Sector EPWP. There was in fact substantial reference to a "chicken and egg" situation. On the one hand it was necessary for drivers to draw up business plans and get them submitted in order to access funds so that dedicated resources could be put in place to drive the programme. On the other hand dedicated resources were needed to put together the business plans. At all levels officials indicated that the Social Sector EPWP was an add on. People are busy carrying out their normal line function jobs and do not have time to commit to the programme – particularly when their own superiors have not necessarily bought into the process. In our view this is of course only partly true. Much of what the EPWP requires is for officials to do what they

usually do but on an expanded and more co-ordinated basis. Certainly however for those who are taking on support and national and provincial co-ordinator roles there can be little doubt that they are being asked to take on an onerous set of additional activities (a number of which may not be that high priority in the eyes of their line superiors—particularly at provincial level).

At present the kick-starting arrangements for the programme amount to a support function being provided by DPW (in the form of a dedicated and high level official) and support via the Business Trust, and more recently a dedicated official within the lead department DSD (with good access to the DG of DSD). At a provincial level kick-starting is expected to emanate from recently appointed provincial co-ordinators (who are not available on a dedicated full-time basis). In general, given the relatively limited resources that have been made available, they have done a highly commendable job to date and we have been impressed by the dedication and grasp of the two dedicated officials (from DSD and DPW). It has also been noted previously that in the past few months there has been a very perceptible escalation of activity around the Social Sector EPWP and this is in large measure due to the activities of the officials referred to above. It should be stressed however that none of the kick-starters referred to above are “drivers” --- they are structurally in a support role. It is in our view necessary to properly identify the drivers and bring them more centrally into the kick-starting process and then to support them in getting going. Thus hands-on programme and project management support to these drivers may be very important (something which the Business Trust under the auspices of DPW could perhaps tackle).

It is also necessary to provide additional resources to those involved in the kick-starting process. In this regard the resources of the Business Trust could prove to be very helpful. They are already being effectively deployed to support the business planning process in the provinces. Moreover it is apparent that both the dedicated officials at DSD and DPW could do with extra help. The official at DSD has for example indicated that the proper resourcing of his support function will take a very long time if the normal procedures of bureaucracy are followed and is keen to get active Business Trust support.

It should also be noted that informants (who have been involved in the conceptualization and early attempts to get the programme going) have noted that promising starts have been made to the programme in the past. However for a variety of reasons – usually related to the loss of key personnel at important times - the initial starts lost momentum and ground to a halt. It is important therefore that the new efforts to get things going sustain their momentum at all costs. A credibility crisis looms if current efforts fail or similarly lose momentum.

3.5 Capacity at all Levels of Particular Programme and Project Management Capacity

Capacity deficits of many types and at all levels is unquestionably an important issue. Many of the capacity issues raised thus far in the analysis could probably apply in other areas of the EPWP such as infrastructure, and not just in respect of the Social Sector EPWP. **However in the Social Sector we became particularly aware of a lack of capacity that is particularly problematic in the Social Sector. This is a capacity to deal with programme and project management in all of its dimensions (e.g. planning, scheduling, procurement, contracting, contract management, reporting etc.).** Thus the issue of Programme and Project management capacity has emerged as a very important issue both with respect to kick-starting the expansion/implementation process and with respect to the potential bottlenecks that are posed.

Programme and project management capacity problems are evident at many levels:

- At National departmental level where often no more than three or four staff members in each of the social sector departments have the responsibility for managing what is a major national programme. The programme management capacity across these staff members is varied but as a general rule it appears that support would be beneficial.
- At provincial level the programmes are also often managed by a relatively small number of officials with quite varied capacities. Whilst there is considerable unevenness across the provinces, generally speaking programme and project management at this level is weak. Provinces are very weak at identifying and registering new HCBC and ECD sites. Moreover provinces are not good at getting HCBC sites or ECD sites to submit project proposals. Moreover they are not very good at incorporating the proposals that they do get into coherent business plans. Contracting with service providers is also often problematic as is the management of funding flows to service providers. The monitoring of the service outputs of service providers is a particularly weak component of existing capacities. Apparently accountability is a major problem. It should be noted that it is precisely these shortcomings which make treasury nervous about putting up more funds even though it claims that it is highly supportive of the Social Sector Plan.

As has been noted previously we established contact with, and interviewed, nearly all of the provinces in the course of our investigation. The nature of the challenges around programme and project management varied quite considerably from one province to another. By way of example the box below provides a brief situational analysis for Kwa-Zulu Natal.

The Social Sector EPWP in KZN

In KwaZulu Natal, where we focused substantial attention, we found that a Provincial Steering Committee has been appointed and there is co-ordination via the office of the Premier. This function was previously located in the Economic Development Department. KZN has strong political leadership giving the programme some momentum. The province has prepared a business plan that provides targets. An EPWP Road Show was held in July with municipalities. Capacity is however seen as a major problem which requires urgent attention. Drivers have been identified in each department but the lack of M&E systems are seen to be a problem. The major challenges are seen to be the capacity issue, as well as the lack of integration between departments.

As far as programme and project management capacity is concerned informants indicated that capacity was variable but perhaps better than in a number of other provinces. However provincial capacity was roundly criticised by informants from the NGO sector. The impression there is that there is little capacity in provincial government. The Department of Health was singled out by one informant. It seems that HCBC stipends that were meant to be paid by DOH had not been paid. The provincial government is not assisting with the identification of training providers which appears to be very difficult. The problems that were seen to hamper delivery in the province were –

- a huge gap between policy and practice
- lack of management capacity in government
- lack of political leadership
- stifling bureaucracy
- lack of recognition of the role and involvement of the NGOs (particularly in HCBC provision)
- lack of information in DOH regarding training and how to access it

A general problem cited is that there has been little or no training yet to HCBC and ECD workers, in the province. Nor has there been a visible paying of stipends. On the ground, in about 20 CBOs, for instance, working in HCBC there is no visible sign of the programme. The NGO are uncertain as to what criteria are being used to select HCBC workers to receive the stipend.

In the Western Cape, people interviewed in the province confirmed a lack of programme and project management capacity. For example, it was reported that the previous person responsible for coordinating the programme had not been very senior and lacked requisite skills.

They also pointed out weaknesses in line function capacities to undertake the basic planning and programming required to operationalize the programme.

The Northern Cape has recently appointed an EPWP coordinator of the Social Sector Plan. A challenge here seems to be that the coordinator is not very senior – yet he has to manage more senior officials in the three line departments. In regard to HCBC, they are waiting for course material to be finalised. Our informant also pointed out that there were serious problems with respect to basic planning and programming skills. People had difficulty charting out the status quo, identifying backlogs, setting targets and making action plans and programmes. Skills regarding the measuring/monitoring of progress against programme were also weakly developed. These weaknesses seemed to apply in a number of provinces.

Some informants indicated that the inclusion of local government in the process was perhaps crucial. They argued that it made no sense for a regional arm of government to administer relations with crèches and CBOs. Local government they argued could bring additional (and needed) management capacity to the party especially since many were involved in their own initiatives around welfare, health and ECD.

CBOs and NGOs seem to support the view that many local governments are far more equipped to programme and project manage the process. And local government appears, from our discussions with them, to have a keen understanding of the issues confronting NGOs.

In essence we have found that programme and project management capacity is limited. We are of the view that this has to be unpacked province by province and across the range of actors (SETAs, NPOs, provincial administrations, local authorities etc.). We also found limited capacity in the Social Sector to do the “hard numbers” and produce business plans (both for bidding processes with treasury and business plan formulation, monitoring and evaluation)

Limited Capacity of the SETAs

There are two SETAs that are involved in the implementation of the EPWP, the Health and Welfare SETA (HWSETA) and the Education Training and Development Practices SETA (ETDPSETA.). As far as HCBC and HWSETA are concerned the agreed process is that the two responsible departments (DSD and DOH) are meant to have agreed what their training needs are (the aim being to train volunteers, matriculants and people in existing jobs so they may upgrade themselves and have better opportunities in the labour market). These needs have then to be communicated to the HWSETA to see if such training modules and courses exist. If there are no such courses, the HWSETA is supposed to ensure that the training modules are developed and that the qualifications are registered with SAQA. A similar process applies to the ETDPSETA.

The next step is for the SETA to identify accredited service providers to undertake the training and to engage in a process of accrediting training providers. Once service providers are accredited, they are paid to provide the training. Whilst there has been fairly good progress in identifying training needs and developing and accrediting courses a number of informants mentioned that a number of required training modules had not been completed. Moreover there is consensus in the HCBC sector that there are insufficient accredited service providers to provide learnerships.

The Education Training and Development Practices SETA seems to be more capacitated than the HWSETA. We were told that there were service providers ready and accredited, although they are not evenly distributed. There are 48 accredited service providers country-wide, however they are mostly concentrated in Gauteng and there are very few, for instance, in the Northern

Cape. (There is also a lack of accredited service providers in HCBC in the Northern Cape, we were told).

In the EDTP SETA training material is there too. It seems that as far as ECD is concerned the major obstacle is the lack of funding for the training from the Skills Development Fund (the SDF pays the trainers directly). Another problem has been the rapid turnover of Chief Executive Officers – three in the past several years, and high turnover of staff.

Some observers argued that the SETAs are overly cautious and bureaucratic so things progress very slowly. Moreover Informants from different provinces had varying comments on the SETAs. In the Free State for instance, the SETA was seen to be a cause of the blockages in implementation as we were told they are under-resourced there. They were unable to assist in identifying training service providers. In the Western Cape, there seems to be a problem in the HWSETA where accreditation of trainers is very slow.

Another problem identified has been an inability of SETAs to capture data on individual learners which has to be done properly before trainees can receive their certification. This problem with data capturing means that there are sometimes long time delays in certifying learners who have completed courses.

The SETAs themselves present a somewhat different view. Senior officials in both SETAs indicated that they felt that the SETAs are doing what they need to do – delivering Unit Standards (qualifications). Learnerships are registered and the curricula are ready. They indicated that they cannot deliver service providers on their own. There is also an important role for the Provincial Departments. They have to inform the SETAs where they want service providers. Only once they do this, will the SETA be in a position to go out and accredit them. The SETAs can only proceed if they are given a list of actual sites where training will proceed. They pointed out that they cannot plan for the programme if details (both with respect to geography and scale) of the intended roll-out are not made available timeously (if at all). Reference was also made to difficulties within SETA system in accessing funding. However this potential bottleneck will probably only be tested when the programme gains impetus and moves to scale.

3.6 Communication

Linked to complexity, as we have said, is the issue of communication. Communication came up many times in our interviews with actors in the programme.

A feature of this investigation has been how hard it has been to get a clear and consistent account about nature, form and trajectory of the programme. We often received quite different accounts on the same informational issues from different players. One consequence of this was that we found the programme quite bewildering at first and very difficult to grasp. Experience in similar contexts elsewhere has taught us that wherever it is difficult to get a clear picture of a programme and its organizational arrangements within a reasonable time, this is more a reflection of confusion and misinformation on the part of the informers than it is a comment on the assessors.

There can also be no doubt that there is a big gulf with respect to knowledge and understanding of the programme between officials at the national level and those in the provinces and local authorities. Moreover NGO and CBOs service- providers constantly complained about not knowing what to do and about generally poor communication.

Communication is always difficult and requires a concerted and ongoing effort. In recent months we have seen evidence of an improvement in this regard. But much must still be done. A systematic communication programme needs to be instituted which clearly defines desired outcomes and inputs and outputs needed to get there. A reasonable outcome to target is that politicians in all the provinces as well as all drivers of implementation across the provinces are able to give a clear account of what the programme is about and their role in it.

3.7 Paradigm Disagreement (jobs versus service delivery)

There are different views on the applicability of the EPWP to the social sector. We were told, for instance, that in the health sector there is a limited opportunity to create jobs. In the words of an informant, ‘in health, HCBC is knowledge based and not labour based (i.e. not-easily-transferable).’ In short there are questions about whether the idea of public works is applicable in a “knowledge-based” social sector. Moreover several informants in the Health and Education Departments suggested that the EPWP should be about “improving the quality of the services not creating more jobs.” The challenge, these informants felt, had to do with the proper integration of service delivery. In the opinion of a senior Health official there is little room for expansion and there is an over-supply of care givers.

It should be noted that this assertion that the HCBC sector is saturated is not a view held by all officials in Health or amongst officials in DSD. The HSRC estimates that there is currently a potential job absorption capacity of 100 500 jobs.

A senior official in Health also made the point that the performance of the sector in relation to the EPWP could not be measured via the kinds of input or output measures used by DPW (like jobs created or miles of roads produced). Instead he pointed out that health measured outcomes using a set of indicators quite different to those used by DPW. These outcomes could only be effectively measured after a relatively long period time. He then went on to argue that in his view there was no lagging in the Health Sector and that the EPWP was on track—depending of course on how you defined and measured it.

In any event it is apparent to us that:

- Important players do not consider expansion to create jobs or extend the reach of services as the issue
- For them it is the quality of service delivery that is the issue
- Some argue that expansion of HCBC is not possible as it is saturated (again this must be countered by those that argue that there is enormous need).
- It is argued that the Social Sector Plan is on track but cannot be quantified

When we first encountered the “paradigm disagreement” issue we were quite worried about it insofar as we felt that it could have far-reaching implications for the implementation of the Social Sector EPWP. However we did however also discover that this paradigm disagreement tended to be confined to the corridors of national departments and that the tension was not evident in the provinces to any great extent. Given that the EPWP will need to be implemented on a decentralised basis we are of the view that addressing the paradigm disagreement is perhaps less important than we initially thought.

3.8 Buy-in and lack of ownership

Communication is one major strategy that can be used to obtain buy-in, and this has not been exploited to the full. Lack of buy-in does arise from other factors, such as petty rivalries and jealousies between departments. In fact we first embarked on the study we anticipated that petty rivalry would be a major issue (as it often is in programmes of this sort). In fact we hypothesised that there would be substantial resistance to DPW's involvement and that there would be a tendency to see the Social Sector EPWP as owned by DPW. In our discussions with officials at national level there was some evidence of this usually expressed in the form of paradigm difference (see our section on paradigm difference above). At provincial level however there was almost no evidence of this tension. In fact the line function departments were eager to see DPW involvement to support them in getting the programme under way.

But even at national level the issue of buy-in should not be overemphasised. When the Social Sector Plan (and associated business plan) was being put together, there was relatively good ownership on the part of the three social sector departments and this has provided sound foundation. Some informants did mention that there is no legislation governing clusters and how they should work. It was felt that the coordinating departments within the clusters were chosen based on powerful individual DGs. This has created tension within the DG community, where DGs of departments who are cluster coordinators are seen as more senior to those who are not. It has also been mentioned that the appointment of the DG DSD as the process-owning DG, rather than the existing cluster co-ordinator (DG Education) has caused some unhappiness. This in turn has led to a perception that the most senior officials meant to be leading the programme are at odds with each other. There may be some truth to this but as noted above we do not think that it should be overstated. Moreover given the decentralised nature of the project, petty rivalry at the centre is perhaps less important in terms of its potential to have negative knock-on effects.

In our view much more important (from a buy-in perspective) than petty rivalries at the centre, is the entire question of provincial (and also local authority buy-in).

We did not encounter any real resistance to the programme at provincial level but rather a lack of knowledge about it and therefore commitment to it. Having said this however we should re-iterate that petty jealousy in respect of the programme at provincial level seems to be the exception rather than the rule. However it is very clear that in many provinces key politicians and key officials have not really bought into the Social Sector EPWP because they don't really understand it or know about it. Ensuring provincial buy-in is as consequence what we consider to be the key "buy-in" challenge.

The situation with respect to local authority and NPO buy-in also appears to be somewhat different. Both sets of actors complain more about exclusion than having a concern about buy-in. In fact both sets seem eager to be involved. A large KZN municipality for example raised concerns about the exclusion of local government from the Social Sector EPWP, especially since they indicated that the municipality was centrally engaged in housing and water-related infrastructure EPWP interventions. Their only contact with the DOH has been in response to requests from the Department for information.

Some of the large NGO/CBO service providers have found that they are unable to access state support (in the form of stipends) for their HCBC work. There is a great deal of confusion as to how the programme works, how to get their volunteers onto stipends, how to link their staff to learnerships, etc. Some of the NGOs that could become accredited training providers have not been able to obtain accreditation even through they have responded to tenders. One large potential trainer in the HCBC field applied for accreditation in June 2004 and has not yet been accredited.

NGOs find the programme, as currently conceived too onerous for participation. They feel there are barriers to their participation in the EPWP as government has made little effort to create awareness of the programme or include the NGOs in it as partners. Moreover there is a distrust on the part of NGOs of government initiatives as there has been a history of government failing to pay NGOs timeously.

3.9 Funding

Essentially there are two forms of funding for EPWP. National funds are allocated via the conditional grant for HCBC, while some HCBC funds and all ECD funds are allocated by provinces through the equitable share. We were told that officials at provincial level have to compete for funds from the total provincial revenue pot and the way in which allocations are made, vary depending on the merits of the plan, budget constraints and the prevailing political priorities.

We were told that a large portion of the provincial budgets for DSD are transferred to NGOs for actual service delivery. Some funds are transferred from province to local government as well. The EPWP is meant to be funded by provincial treasury allocations being made to the three departments as part of their routine budgeting for ECD and HCBC. Our informant felt that this could be problematic as there is a history of under-spending, at provincial level. So to expect higher allocations to be made, without a visible improvement in performance is unlikely. The reason why provincial budgets for the Social Sector EPWP have traditionally been so low has to do with the fact that there has been inadequate capacity and management expertise, insufficient prioritisation of social services as a component of people's rights and inadequate prioritisation of delivery of social services.

Initial discussions with informants in treasury reveal that funds are available at national level for certain aspects of the EPWP that can be funded nationally. In fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that treasury is eager to fund the implementation of the Social Sector Plan (or at least components of it). A discussion with a treasury informant, for example, revealed that treasury is keen to put R500 million into the Community Health Workers Programme. It was envisaged that this money will be made available via equitable shares allocations to the provinces. The informant indicated that the money could be available and on provincial budgets by April of 2006 provided that the necessary business planning can be done and provided that treasury could feel comfortable that the necessary management and monitoring arrangements are in place. It would seem that this would also be dependent on provincial 'buy-in' so that the allocation of this money to the EPWP would be made instead of to other provincial priorities.

Treasury indicated strongly however that it was not prepared to pour money into a "bottomless pit". At present it is apparent that treasury does not believe that the social sector has the management infrastructure in place to allow for expansion. Unless this is addressed there definitely will be problems with additional funding for the sector.

More specifically, if one accepts that a large portion of the funds available nationally are to be paid via the equitable share to provinces, the provinces have to be in a position to utilise such funds. Apparently, the HSRC has been told by Treasury that it is willing to release R7b to the provinces for implementing the EPWP, but that it is concerned about their ability to absorb such funds, as it is not sure if the NGO sector, in particular has the capacity to absorb these funds. It seems that the relationship between provincial social sector departments and NGOs is poor. As previously noted NGOs feel that they are badly treated on funding issues e.g. late contracting, delays in agreeing to renew contracts, contract renewal being negotiated in a hostile manner so as not to cover holidays, bonuses etc. Generally, we were told that there has been a lack of

good will between NGOs and social sector departments, with NGOs feeling abused. A point that came through very strongly is that this NGO concern is important because the implementation of the EPWP is strongly reliant on the involvement of the NGO sector.

One of our informants said that an important challenge is to build provincial capacity to manage bigger budgets effectively. This would require a better understanding within provincial treasuries of the nature of the Social Sector EPWP. It would also require skills development in provincial social sector departments in regard to inter alia interacting with their own treasuries, the training of people to develop good business plans, and the development of better skills to deal with partners .

These kinds of interventions can only really succeed if awareness of the EPWP is raised among provincial treasuries and affected line departments. There is a particular need to build advocacy capacity in provincial social sector departments to bargain for funds based on plans for implementation with costings. Also there must be the development of better monitoring systems to track the process. Awareness has to be developed in all levels of the budgeting process of the obligation to prioritise EPWP programmes.

Whilst funding may be available in principle for many of the implementing line functions (at both national and provincial level) the current reality is that they are being expected to make arrangements for growth and expansion without any additional funding. There seems to be some resentment about this with some informants reporting that some line function managers complain about an “extra loading” over and above the normal load they are expected to carry. It is apparently only in Public Works that dedicated staff have been put in place to drive the EPWP. This suggests that some thought should be given to the possibility of making short term funding available to help kick start the process. Precisely how such funds are to be used needs careful consideration but it might be possible for example to bring in consultants on a temporary basis to take some of the normal load off senior official so that they can focus on the EPWP.

It should be noted too that there appear to be different perceptions about the availability of funds (both current and future). Whilst many are of the view that the programme will bring substantial new money, some players have the view that the EPWP is not about “more” money but rather about the way in which existing money is used. These different perceptions may have different impacts on motivation. Even if substantial “new money” is available some players are highly skeptical about it ever reaching them. This seems to be the case with a number of NGO’s and CBO’s for example. There is also concern from the SETAs that they may not get access to any “new funds” since they access funds mainly via levies. (The expression of this sentiment by a SETA is surprising, since in our understanding SETAs only obtain their funding from the skills levy).

It appears that perhaps the most important funding issue as far as the ECD component of the Social Sector Plan is concerned is the fact that there is currently no dedicated funding stream for ECD personnel. For some this appears to be a crippling issue and it certainly raises important policy issues.

It was stated that less than 1% of the Education budget, for example, is allocated to the EPWP.

Officials that we spoke to from Treasury assured us that money for this programme is potentially available. It has already been noted but is worth re-iterating that key treasury officials constantly indicated that the main problem is that the main social sector departments are unable to spend and manage their current budget allocations – both in absolute terms and in terms of proper accounting for expenditure. It is a problem in the social sector in general. The administration of programmes is below standard, there is a lack of auditability. Current management relations have to be rectified. Treasury has a unit to help line functions but social departments don’t use

it. Social sector departments are far weaker than other departments in the annual bidding process at national level. They have great difficulties in doing the hard numbers and making a compelling argument for their requests for funding.

Finally important officials in treasury feel that it is very important that those involved in the Social Sector EPWP get closer to treasury – at both national and provincial levels. The feeling is that treasury should be involved in strategic decision-making and included on key institutional structures set up for the programme. We certainly agree.

In sum then:

Funding definitely is available in principle (we should note that it is not clear how much, nor if it is specifically available for the social sector, and if there is sufficient for full coverage of service provision. And there is lack of clarity as to whether it is available for line functions in provinces or as conditional grants)

A key issue is the production of good business plans

The social sector departments have to convince treasury that they can spend the money and that appropriate management arrangements are in place

Treasury has concerns about way things are currently being managed

There is a need for the social sector to be more efficient in bidding processes at both national and provincial level

Treasury prefers the equitable shares route for funds implying that provincial commitment to the programme is crucial. If they are not limited funds will be allocated to the programme.

Treasury officials should be brought into a much closer relationship with key Social Sector EPWP drivers.

3.10 Complexity

There is no doubt that that the Social Sector EPWP is a very complex initiative. This complexity is evident in the fact that it is an initiative that is :

Multi-level

Multi-actor

Multi-sector

There are many contingencies In the programme especially linked to training.

Involves multiple funding streams

For initiatives like this to succeed very strong leadership and strong management capacities are required. But even if these conditions are met there are many points in the chain where problems and blockages can be experienced. Many such points have been pointed out by informants. An example is the SETAs. They are not direct drivers of the process but are crucial to the training component. In many instances, as we said, the participating departments and the SETAs have not developed the qualifications frameworks in terms of which the training is to happen. Moreover their ability to identify, manage and co-ordinate service providers of training is limited.

It remains our view that the hypothesis that the Social Sector Plan is just too complex is one that deserves serious attention. It should also be noted that in the context of such complexity the need for good and clear communication is absolutely imperative. Our informants in the NGO, CBO, Education Service Provider and local government environments all stressed that they had little information about the programme and that communication was extremely poor. Many expressed a desire to participate but had been frustrated by a combination of poor communication and in their view shoddy handling by government. Conditions for participation

were often too onerous and restricting (and quite unrealistic in the circumstances). Many of our informants indicated that the Social Sector Plan was not very “visible” on the ground at present even in the province where the Community Health Worker programme was being piloted. Others stated that the concept of the EPWP was not fully understood.

There is an inherent complexity in any governmental programme that straddles more than one department and also includes a multitude of institutions (SETAs, service providers). Questions asked by people interviewed highlighted some of the complexity. For instance, informants wanted clarity on the criteria that government would use to select training service providers. Who would decide on which people would be eligible for learnerships? One informant attached to the NGO sector cited an example where many volunteers were being used in clinics, and expected that they would be considered for jobs if they became available. Then, “out of the blue” the DOH in that province appointed a number of CHWs into the very same clinics where the volunteers were, managed by the municipality. This was seen as very under-mining to the volunteers who became very disillusioned. Others asked how HCBC workers, for instance, who were to be recruited and trained were to be incorporated into the programme.

Evidence from elsewhere in the developing world is that there has been significant success in delivering public works programmes at scale. But virtually all of the successful programmes are quite simple in their conception (Anna to elaborate).

Whether the Social Sector EPWP will be too complex to implement successfully will, in our view, depend largely on the nature of the driving arrangements that are put in place in the next stage. As we have noted previously if drivers are clearly identified and co-ordination across line departments is handled in such a way that it does not require constant consultation/interaction and does not set up a plethora of contingencies, it is possible that the programme can develop a head of steam (insofar as line functions will be able to operate as line functions but within a co-ordinated framework). We would also urge that in the setting up of the driving arrangements there should be a conscious effort to reduce complexity and contingency wherever possible. For instance, were the policy to be re-framed as a programme to expand employment quality and coverage in the social sector – expanding the current way of doing things – this may be much clearer.

3.11 Unresolved Policy Issues

The impression gained in the inception phase was that unresolved policy issues were an issue but perhaps less important than originally thought. Whilst there are unresolved issues which may affect the efficiency of delivery it seems to us that considerable progress has been made in developing and aligning policy and that policy is unlikely to be a “game-breaker” when it comes to implementation. Two policy issues that deserve attention are:

The issue of whether or not government should provide an ongoing funding stream for ECD activities (and mainly the payment of pre-school teachers)

The related and more philosophical issue of “volunteers” versus “paid” staff in both ECD and HCBC.

Commitment to paying ECD service providers is seen in some quarters as crucial to realising the long term job creation potential that the sector offers and this may well be so. Of course this raises the question of volunteerism versus salaried staff which is also important in HCBC. Many people we have spoken to have raised the contradictions and problems that arise as a result of a lack of clarity on the issue. A number of health care sites have for example noted the negative

impact of paying stipends on the level of volunteerism (some local authorities have raised the point quite angrily). It seems that a clearer position from the Social Sector Departments is needed. One possibility is to regard a certain amount of volunteerism a necessary prerequisite to (or stepping-stone towards) the payment of a stipend.

Research undertaken by the HSRC has also revealed that there is considerable concern that the Grade R programme is undermining ECD at community sites. This is because of the tendency to enroll under-age children in Grade R because of the higher level of care provided (by comparison with what is provided at community sites). The net effect is to undermine the viability of the community sites.

The linking of Policy to Implementation: Policy done but insufficiently explicit guidelines for implementation

In some national government departments it is customary to augment policy with more detailed guidelines for implementation. This is usually done to explicitly close the gap between policy and practice. As far as the Social Sector EPWP is concerned the only guidelines are the various recommendations made in the Action Plan regarding interventions that should be made. These are too generalised to guide implementation. What is needed is the development of a more detailed implementation framework. On the basis of this framework a detailed set of implementation guidelines could be drafted for each line function department at national and provincial level and for the SETAs and NPO's. Ideally the provincial business plans should be drawn up in terms of these guidelines.

The DPLG policy document entitled the National Framework for Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa argues that there has to be real care taken to "avoid undefined joining up of government, and the risk that joined up government becomes a paralysing *joint decision trap* (page 12). This point is made in the context of a discussion on how difficult it is to implement programmes that require intergovernmental coordination. The document quotes a National Treasury paper written in 2003 which states that coordination has to be linked to performance (quoted page 11). It carries on to say that coordination requires all players to deliver on their functions. This really presumes that their functions are defined.

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Reduce confusion over coordination, support and driving roles.

Make special arrangements for driving.

Key drivers at all levels have to be identified

- Clarify the role of provincial coordinators. If it includes driving, empower them accordingly. If their role is essentially co-ordination make this very clear to all.
- Make special arrangements for the vertical driving of the programme. This is a special programme and whilst it should work largely through the existing machinery of government special arrangements are required if unusual impact is to be achieved. At present the special institutional arrangements for the Social Sector EPWP are essentially co-ordination arrangements not driving arrangements. Special arrangements for vertical driving must also be made.
- Very important with respect to arrangements for vertical driving are special accountability arrangements. It is crucial that those with the authority (muscle) to demand performance should continually monitor such delivery performance against what has been planned.
- Oversight of performance against programme should occur regularly (rather than at the end of a financial year).
- Establish arrangements to ensure that the SETAs (and those to whom the SETAs account) can be held accountable on a regular basis for the outputs they are meant to deliver
- Establish arrangements to ensure that NPO delivery performance can be monitored and to ensure that they can be held accountable.
- Ensure that performance of the Social Sector EPWP is written into the annual KPIs of officials driving the process
- Consider incentivising the various driving departments

Note the importance of decentralisation for driving arrangements

- Accept that the context for the Social Sector EPWP is decentralisation mainly because of the way funding works (vertical decentralisation) but also because NPOs are involved in delivery (horizontal decentralisation).
- Recognise that this means that there are many drivers rather than one or two central drivers
- Identify these drivers clearly
- Make them accountable

- Recognise that national Director Generals have limited capacity to ‘crack-the-whip’ with respect to overseeing and driving programmes at provincial level
- It is appropriate for Director General’s of the Provinces and Heads of line departments at provincial level to play this role. If local authorities are mobilized the City Managers/CEO’s are also key overseers.

Coordination and delivery

- Do not confuse coordination with driving (delivery)
- Recognise that the major coordination role has been completed, with the finalisation of the policy
- It is not necessarily fruitful to reproduce national institutional arrangements in the provinces (as these arrangements are often suited to coordination of policy not implementation).
- Recognize however that some coordination is necessary for effective driving
- Reduce the distance between driving and co-ordination processes by strengthening DSD’s leverage as a process owner. One possibility in this regard is to give DSD a special budget to enable it to leverage co-operation.
- Identify exactly what needs to be coordinated in the future (especially with respect to driving)
- Check whether current and planned institutional structures are appropriate
- Ensure that coordination meetings are infrequent but content-filled and effective
- National coordination should deal with inter alia –
 - Policy issues
 - Strategies for bidding for money from treasury
 - Overseeing the broad measurement of the outcomes of the programme and reporting these to Cabinet
 - Broad leadership and actor co-ordination
- Provincial coordination should deal with inter alia –
 - Information transmission
 - Attaining buy-in
 - Strategising about the content and form of provincial business plans
 - Setting base agreements for implementation in place, and
 - Occasionally coordinating and sequencing implementation.

Support

- Recognize that the key support role at this stage is mobilization. Be sure that the mobilization effort is focussed on the right players (key drivers)
- Recognize that the emphases of the support role will change over the cycle of project implementation.

- Recognize that support in basic planning and programme and project management is also a key support function at this early stage of the Social Sector EPWP
- Recognize that support to drivers at all levels regarding improving the expenditure, management and reporting performance on existing activities will be important in order to leverage in additional funds.
- Recognize and acknowledge clearly that DPW plays a support role (not driving)
- DPW has in our view has a particularly important role in enhancing the programme and project management capacities of all drivers in the process – particularly line function managers in the provinces but also in the SETAS and the NPO's.
- DPW's support mandate must be communicated to all role players
- It should be clearly recognized that the dedicated staff in the national DSD office are involved primarily in a combined support and co-ordination function rather than a driving function. Their support role could focus primarily be the mobilisation of the all key players and the monitoring of programme implementation across the provinces.

4.2 Mobilise Political and Technical Leadership Appropriately

- More active championing by national and provincial politicians is required.
- DG's must be more active in showing support and championing the process. The DG's should consider a joint trip around the country lobbying support for the programme.
- Leadership by politicians and officials in provinces must be emphasised
- Political and technical leaders in the provinces have to be identified, mobilised and educated on the programme, as at present they are not knowledgeable enough about the Social Sector EPWP to provide leadership
- Active mobilization of NPO service providers is needed. Their leadership in certain areas (where they have expertise) should be acknowledged, allowed and mobilized
- Bottom up initiatives should be supported and encouraged politically

4.3 Undertake Critical Path Planning

- Critical path planning at both national and provincial levels should be undertaken which –
- Identifies and sequences 'critical actions' (those that leverage or catalyse other actions)
- Ensure that all "critical actions" are in fact undertaken.

4.4 Boost Kick-Starting Capacity

- Identify drivers and bring them more centrally into the kick-starting process and support them to get going (kick-starting is currently being done by those who are structurally in either co-ordinating or support roles)
- Additional resources should be provided to those involved in the support process. (Business Trust is already assisting with business planning in the provinces). The two dedicated officials at DSD and DPW could also benefit from Business Trust support.
- Focus attention on improving capacity in provinces to register new sites (Use existing NPO's to assist)
- Investigate NPO capacity to contribute to kick-starting
- Sustain momentum.
- Develop a kick-starting plan and resource it

4.5 Build Programme and Project Management Capacity at all Levels

- Enhance capacity to deal with programme and project management in all its dimensions (planning, scheduling, procurement, contracting, contract management, reporting etc) at all spheres of government and in the SETAs and NPO's.
- Mobilise Local government to enhance implementation capacity.
- It will be necessary to unpack programme and project management capacity needs province by province as the situation differs in each
- Give impetus to the programme and then monitor the performance of the SETAs and NPOs. Identify capacity needs and provide support. Areas which should receive immediate attention are identification and accreditation of training service providers as well as the process of certifying learnerships.

4.6 Improve Communication

- Many of the current communication problems could probably be resolved by putting in place clear arrangements for driving and accountability.
- Involvement of SETAs and NPO's in putting these driving arrangements in place (particularly planning and scheduling) should also contribute substantially to improved communication.
- The nature, form and trajectory of the programme has to be clearly communicated to relevant politicians and officials at national, provincial and local levels (see also the recommendations regarding buy-in).
- Particular attention should be given to improving communication with NPOs

- A systematic communication programme must be instituted which clearly defines desired outcomes; and inputs and outputs needed to get there. Such a programme should however be closely linked to plan for/arrangements for driving the programme

4.7 Get buy-in particularly at provincial level and below

Focus on achieving buy-in from key politicians and key officials at provincial level. At present there does not appear to be any resistance from provincial level, rather a lack of knowledge about the programme and how to get going.

Local authorities should be mobilised and buy-in from politicians and officials must be achieved

Effort should be put into achieving NPO buy-in

The process of obtaining buy-in should go hand –in-hand with the process of making special arrangements for driving the programme.

4.8 Address Funding Issues

- Involve provincial and national treasury in strategic decision-making and include them on key institutional structures set up for the programme
- Improve capacity of provinces to spend existing social sector funding allocations
- Improve provincial capacity to manage, monitor and account for funds expended
- Build up overall provincial awareness and buy-in of the Social Sector EPWP so that more of the equitable share is allocated by provinces themselves to departments implementing the programme (instead of allocating funds for other priorities). This requires social sector departments to spend the money they do have better and on being capacitated to bargain better for funds (based on concrete plans for implementation).
- Build up provincial capacity to prepare business plans
- Train provincial social sector departments how to interact with provincial treasuries more effectively and visa versa
- Inform provincial treasuries about the Social Sector EPWP and obtain their buy-in
- Build up capacity in the NPOs to manage and report on funds
- Develop skills among provincial social sector departments and NPO's to work effectively with each other so that the partnership between the two can grow and money can be disbursed more successfully
- Make some short term funding available to help kick start the process as many officials complain about an "extra loading." Consultants, for instance, could be brought in on a temporary basis to take some of the load off senior officials, so that they can focus on EPWP.

- Enhance the ability of social sector departments at national level to bid effectively for funds

4.9 Reduce Complexity

- In the context of a policy as complex as the Social Sector Plan, there is a critical need for good and clear communication
- Reduce the complexity when the driving arrangements are set up by ensuring that drivers are clearly identified and that coordination is not overly burdensome

4.10 Deal with unresolved policy issues

- Clarify issues that arise regarding voluntarism versus salaried staff.
- Clarify the relationship between Grade R and the rest of the ECD programme. The claim from the ground is that Grade R undermines the rest of the programme.
- Translate policy into detailed implementation guidelines.

Annexure 1:

SUMMARY OF SOCIAL SECTOR PLAN 2004

The SPP was conceptualised as a programme where jobs could be expanded in the areas of Home/Community Based Care (HCBC) for AIDs sufferers and Early Childhood Development (ECD). These were seen as the two areas where there were immediate work and training opportunities. The Social Sector Plan is seen as part of the broader Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) adopted by Cabinet in June 2004.

The thrust of the SSP is to re-orientate line function budgets and conditional grants so that government expenditure results in more work opportunities, particularly for unskilled labour (page 7). The aim is to train unemployed people so that they may either set up their own businesses eventually, or become employed. No special budgets are required, as the programme is meant to be funded by existing line function budgets.

The way the programme is to work, for the entire EPWP is that people are meant to be trained for a set period – maybe two days a month, and while in the training, they are to be employed under conditions that are not covered by the usual labour legislation. This could mean their salaries are lower than usual and that they do not have the same rights as employees in terms of labour law. However, they are benefiting from being trained and the training is meant to be linked to exit opportunities.

In the social sector the idea is to use existing volunteers – develop their skills, train them and give them opportunities to become participants in the mainstream economy (page 7).

HCBC

The Social Sector Plan deals with HCBC first. Here the definition is that this is the provision of services – both health care and social services, by formal and informal care-givers, in the home. Much of the care is focused on families in need, through poverty, illness (AIDs) and other situations that have caused difficulty.

The programme is a joint initiative by the Department of Social Development (DSD) and the Department of Health (DOH). The work opportunities are to be provided at HCBC sites managed by NGOs. The aim is for the two departments to support the opportunities through their conditional grant funding programmes. Beneficiaries can exit after a 12 to 24 month work-place opportunity. The levels of training are NQF levels 1, 3 and 4.

A survey of existing HCBC provision was conducted in 2003 that demonstrated that at that stage there were 892 HCBC sites – 87% of which were run by NGOs and CBOs. About 65% of funding for these sites was being provided for by the government. The funding from government was in the form of conditional grants of between R50 000 and R200 000 per site per annum. The number of personnel at the sites was 31 565, 19 616 of which were volunteers, 15 326 of whom were receiving no allowance or remuneration.

Many aims and targets are set in the SSP which makes it confusing at times. One aim is to build up the provision of home based care by increasing the number of sites per year by 300, which requires the training of 3000 care workers per annum as the assumption is that there should be at least 10 HCBC workers per site. Another aim, is that there be one care worker (at NQF level 4) per 250 households. On this model 35 000 community care workers are needed to keep the standard of care at a level recommended by the WHO (page 9). A further cited aim is that the Department of Health provides a Community Health Worker (CHW) for every 150 households.

And another target is that 122 240 work opportunities should be provided – 17 400 of which should occur through learnerships over five years (page 10) in accordance with three plans.

1. Plan A. The aim is to provide 19 988 work opportunities based on the existing 5 988 volunteers who receive stipends, being increased by about 1000 per year through to 2009. As these people are trained and exit, it is projected that 19 988 work opportunities would be created. They would now be trained at NQF levels 1 and 3. It is not entirely clear exactly how the training of around 7 000 volunteers will translate into 19 988 jobs. It is estimated that cost of each new work opportunity is R24 70 per annum. (for Plan B too). Later in the report, it is stated that there is no additional cost for Plan A outside the cost of training pegged at R10 000 per worker (page 17). This is never very clearly explained.

2. Plan B. The provision of an additional 90 252 jobs is premised on the capacity to absorb additional employees based on existing volunteers managed in the system. The idea is to expand the pool of employed volunteers (by paying more stipends).

DSD is able to pay 4 284 people at NQF 1 and 3 levels at an average cost of R24 700 per work opportunity per annum. It is not clear if this money comes out of the DSD budget in the form of conditional grants or via the skills levy.

DOH aims to provide a community worker for every 250 households and the aim is an estimated 9 000 work opportunities under DOH plus 3 000 under Umsobomvu (the National Youth Organisation).

A further aim it to create 17 400 level 4 learnerships as part of rolling out the CHW programme funded by the SETA.

Plan B will cost an additional R253 m for DSD posts and R240m for DOH posts.

3. Plan C. By expanding the programme beyond the current HCBC sites and establishing 300 new sites per annum and hence 3 000 work opportunities per annum or 12 000 over 4 years (page 10) it is estimated that the cost of creating the 3 000 work opportunities per annum would be R30 360 per post.

The cost of Plan C is R90.8 m per annum.

Some challenges are identified in the report.

For instance, that there is a danger that all volunteers will expect to be paid. One does not want to remove the spirit of voluntarism that is so strong in this sector. A communication strategy is suggested, to deal with this.

The need for all the departments providing HCBC services to agree on norms and standards. Here a particular target is identified – to have these written up into the conditional grant conditions.

The need to register unit standards at NQF level 3 and 4 for CHWs. The need for the HWSETA to fast track the development of learnerships and register and accredit service providers.

Additional points about Funding of HCBC

HCBC services are provided by NGOs funded via conditional grants. In 2003/4 R147m was allocated. Funding is released in 3 tranches. The first tranche is only released if a business plan

is provided with an operational plan and a cash flow for the financial year. Thereafter the second and third tranches are paid on the basis of reporting, monitoring and evaluation.

In addition DOH allocates some of its equitable share budget to HCBC. Again, here, financial management tools have to be used by provinces to account for the funding (page 17).

Standardisation of allowances

The aim is to standardise allowances paid. For levels 1, 2 and 3 R500 per person should be paid, and for HCBC level 4, R1 000.

The SPP identifies a danger, which is that provinces may not always prioritise the EPWP, as they may have other pressures. In respect of HCBC this is addressed by the fact that there has been a conditional grant which has resulted in increased targeting and focus.

Early Childhood Development (ECD)

The SPP identifies the need for an integrated ECD plan to be developed. This has subsequently been done, after the SSP report was completed.

The report distinguishes between the role that is played by DSD in respect of the ECD and the DOE. DOE is seen to be responsible for Grade R's whereas DSD is seen as playing a role in the under 5s. 8429 sites are registered with the two departments. These are part of a total of 23 482 sites identified.

All the proposed work opportunities are to be provided at ECD sites currently managed by NGOs.

The DOE provided a conditional grant to train 4 500 Grade R teachers. And the DSD subsidises 4 612 sites at any amount of between R4.20 and R6.00 per day.

If all the 3.8 million children aged 0-6 living in poverty were catered for 60 000 ECD sites would be needed, with an average of 5 care-givers per site. In 2001 a study found that only 16% of 0-6 year olds were in ECD.

Trained personnel is seen to be a huge problem too as 23% of care-givers have no training and the remaining 83% need further training. The aim of the ECD programme is to skill 19 800 practitioners over 5 years.

The manner in which job expansion is envisaged is that the training will allow people to find secure paid employment afterwards.

There are four plans.

Plan A. The aim is to provide 24 300 work opportunities through the SETA learnerships and the DOE training of Grade R teachers. The aim, through the SETA is to pay about R520 per learner per month. The DOE allowance is for R1000 per learner per month.

Plan B. The aim is to train 9 224 unemployed people in DSD sites where the indigent subsidy is being paid. The assumptions is based on training 2 practitioners per site in a poor areas that are currently registered with DSD (4 612 sites). This is a short term plan for 2004/5. It would be interesting to know if it has been carried out. Here the cost would be R500 per learner per month. Rolling out Plan B could cost R17,5 m per year.

Plan C. This targets the remaining ECD sites in poor areas and aims to create 13 776 work opportunities. Here the idea is to train 2 practitioners per unregistered site that the DSD plans to register. It is premised on the successful registration of all unregistered sites. And again the cost would be R500 per learner per month. It could cost R26, 2 m per year in addition to R349 m in subsidies needed to support the programme.

A conditional grant for expanding ECD is proposed in the SPP as it allows the ring fencing of sites in areas of extreme poverty.

Plan D. Aims to train 3 000 unemployed parents and 4000 support staff in existing schools. It is seen as a long term plan. The aim is to create an additional 19 000 work opportunities targeting ECD support staff and parents (page 13).

ECD challenges are identified –

Registration of sites

Demand for subsidies will increase as more sites are registered

Shortage of materials at sites

Lack of integrated interdepartmental implementation framework and coordination

Shortage of accredited training providers

ECD Funding

Currently DSD funds food to children in poverty at about 4612 sites. This is costing R233m per annum. DOE provided limited support to 4 500 sites through a conditional grant of R 196m.

It costs R23 520 to create an ECD work opportunity. The cost of the employment opportunity linked to the skills programme is R19 000 but this has to be added to the cost of the registration drive and the cost of expanding subsidies.

The SPP states that one of the dangers with ECD funding is that it is currently provided by DSD through the equitable share. And the danger is that provinces have many pressures to spend funds, and their priorities shift. This means that money is not consistently available. A recommendation is that in order to kick start ECD, a conditional grant is required to ensure that ECD is prioritised. This conditional grant would need to fund subsidies, the development of management capacity and jobs (page 27).

Institutional Arrangements

Many of the proposals have never materialised.

For instance, at national level the idea was to have regular reports to the DG Cluster meeting and an annual meeting of the three DGs to review progress. The Inter-departmental steering committee responsible for overall coordination was to meet monthly. And champions appointed by the three DGs were to serve on this committee. A quarterly stakeholder coordinating forum was to meet to review progress, table reports and discuss strategy.

The national steering committee was tasked, among other things, with compiling baseline information on what norms and standards are being applied by each department and province. Guidelines are meant to have been circulated and finalised. This is meant to have been done ahead of the 2005/6 budget.

Internal departmental task teams were to be established.

At provincial level the aim is to have an inter-departmental steering committee to coordinate EPWP which meets monthly. A champion appointed by the MEC is meant to serve on the committee. A quarterly coordinating forum is meant to meet – of stakeholders, exactly the same as the national one. Similar inter-departmental task teams are to be established.

Roles and responsibilities are defined.

National

Here the responsibility is for policy, and provision of a regulatory framework. Also national government must provide leadership to contribute to coordination. Communication is a national function and the provision of a legal framework for partnerships. Other national functions include, monitoring, evaluation, conditional grant funding, auditing and identification of national programme areas (page 24).

Provincial

The use of conditional grants in line with national priorities is a provincial function. As is the job of identifying opportunities and need. Other functions include – application of national norms and standards, monitoring and evaluation, communication with delivery agencies, developing partnerships, administering learnerships and maintaining information systems. Provinces must also put in place the required capacity to roll out the programme.

Local Authorities

Local authorities must mobilise communities and link services to communities. Potential exists to expand the HCBC programme through clinics under local authorities.

Partners

NGOs deliver the services and the employment opportunities. They receive government support via conditional grants or subsidies. Their responsibilities include record keeping, exit counselling, facilitating training, hosting learnerships and management of the employment opportunities.

SETAs

There are two SETAs involved. The EDTP SETA and the HWSETA. The main role of the SETAs is to expand their services and boost their HR capacity, resource pools and breadth of services so as to register training service providers and train assessors.

Department of Labour (DOL)

The EPWP requires the departments concerned to submit their training plans to the DOL. DOL has to advise on programmes, policies, training, qualification frameworks and exit strategies. It has to work with the SETAs on the expanded mandate. Financial support through the National Skills Fund is crucial.

Umsobomvu (NYS)

They are currently aiming to train and employ 7 000 youth per annum. A partnership is to be formalised through an MOU.

Capacity Needs

Project Management

The SPP identifies the need for a dedicated Project Management Team, in each department.

Training

Various training needs have been identified such as technical support to the HWSETA, assistance with registering training service providers, a management agent to administer all learnerships on behalf of provincial departments, ECD materials (page 26).

Management information systems and tools

Here there is a need for information systems on monitoring and evaluation, research, registration of service providers and audit capacity.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Capacity in the arena of monitoring is seen to be weak.

Communication Strategy

There are three aspects of communication. Firstly the aim is to ensure all internal role players are kept abreast of developments in the programme. Secondly external stakeholders must be informed and be able to make inputs. Finally the public must be aware of the programme. The responsibility for communication lies with the EPWP unit in the DPW.

Research Requirements

It is important to compile baseline data on the identified pilot areas against which the impact of the programme can be measured. Also research has to be undertaken to ensure that the assumption that there is a progression from a volunteer to a work place opportunity is realisable.

Risk Management

The key challenge is to translate work opportunities into long term livelihoods. Exit opportunities are likely to fall on the government. Another danger is that the EPWP will undermine volunteerism. A good communication strategy could avoid this risk.

Another risk is that there is inadequate HR to implement the programme, both in government and in the NGO sector.

A risk is that provinces will not prioritise the EPWP which could compromise the programme. A greater provincial consultation process could mitigate this.

Concluding remarks

While the SPP provides a great deal of information and is a sound policy document, many of the details are confusing. There is a need to take the document forward, which the Action Plan

attempts to do, in order to concretise many of the proposals. At a broad general policy level, the document is useful, but as a guide for implementation, it has limited value. What it does achieve, is an important starting point that allows others to take the process forward, far more systematically.

Annexure 2:

SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYMENT EXPANSION ACTION PLAN. 17th May 2005

The Employment Expansion Action Plan, dated 17th May 2005 attempts to take the Social Sector Plan, which sets out the policy, forward into a clearer implementation strategy. The thrust behind this Action Plan was a perception that more detail was required to identify problems in implementation and to advise on how to roll out the programme more effectively.

The Action Plan quotes the Government Programme of Action which states that government wants to commit itself to two sets of deliverables, namely –

To strengthen the integrated plan for comprehensive Early Childhood Development programmes by providing additional funding to allow expansion, and
To introduce steps to increase the numbers of Community Health Workers, with “harmonised training standards” and to increase resources allocated to the programme. (page 9) (the Community Health Workers programme was to be combined with existing HCBC projects into one composite HCBC programme)

The Action Plan says DOH, DSD and DOE have revised the original Social Sector Plan and that the “revised plan provides a framework for government to deliver services to communities as part of government’s mandate ... to improve the socio-economic conditions of the poor and ensure access to social services. Consequently, people trained through the EPWP initiative will be well placed to exit into longer term employment opportunities created by the responsible departments.” (Page 10)

Thus the emphasis in the Action Plan has shifted somewhat away from job creation, and towards creating better (higher quality and expanded) service delivery at the same time as providing learning opportunities and training. In the Action Plan the main objectives are to facilitate and address delivery challenges in ECD and HCBC/CHW.

However the objective of creating jobs is still very much there. The new plan sets as its aim – by 2010 - the creation of 167 073 new work opportunities in the HCBC/CHW sector (107 518 fall under DOH and 59 555 under DSD). 24 000 are to be long term CHW posts (that must presumably be created by DOH). It also aims to create 106 000 ECD work opportunities for ECD practitioners by 2010, 58 000 which will combine training with work experience and 48 000 of which will be the creation of long term work opportunities (page 5).

In the Action Plan ECD and HCBC are discussed separately.

How the Action Plan defines EPWP

The short-to-medium term programme aims to –
Create temporary work opportunities for at least 1m unemployed people;
Provide public goods and services at acceptable standards;
Increase the potential of participants to earn money in the future by upgrading their skills and opportunities to enter the first economy.

The essence of the programme is that for not more than 24 months, beneficiaries are able to be employed under learnerships on terms and conditions not governed by labour legislation.

ECD and EPWP

Here the focus is on providing work place experience and training to people involved in ECD of children from birth to age five (page 16).

The target is for ECD to have 1 million children in care by 2010. This requires the registration of 20 000 ECD sites among other things and the training of 50 000 practitioners for the 3-4 year olds and 67 000 for 2-3 year olds. It also requires the adoption of an intersectoral policy as there is a need to coordinate ECD services with social development funding for food to sites (page 6).

The Action Plan cites the ECD targets as being the creation of 106 000 work opportunities by 2010. 34 000 of these will be work opportunities for unemployed people, who will receive NQF level 1 training and short-term income. (Income will be in the form of a stipend – the proposal is that it be R500 per month) 24 000 will be for unemployed people to work and receive training at NQF level 4. (Income will be in the form of a stipend – here the stipend will be higher – approximately R 1000 per month). An additional 48 000 long term employment opportunities will be created
(Page 24).

The Action Plan sees the implementation taking place as follows. Unemployed people (preferably existing volunteers, who may or may not be receiving stipends) entering the EPWP/ECD programme with a Grade 7 equivalent are to be provided with 2 years work experience and NQF level 1 and 3 qualifications. DSD must plan and budget for longer term expansion of its human resources and must fund posts for some of these people when they exit the training.

In addition, existing ECD employed people are to have their skills upgraded through further training and capacity building (Page 6 and 16).

In addition, DSD must increase the registration of sites and expand support for vulnerable children.

The Action Plan stresses the need to improve the services offered to children. If all the 6.5 million children aged 0-6 were catered for by ECD sites there would have to be 60 000 sites with about 5 care-givers per site. The ECD target is 20 000 sites. To date only 8 229 are registered, “a far cry from the target of 20 000 ” (page 20). (This target is meant to be achieved by 2010)

The document identifies a huge problem with current ECD delivery to the under 5's, saying that only 21% of 5-6 year olds, 15% of 3-5 year olds and 5% of children under 3 are in ECD care. And many of the sites are under-resourced, and the staff not trained. 85% of staff need further training (page 12).

The Action Plan says that there is “currently no programme of support for practitioners servicing the 0-5 years age cohort. Currently, poor communities do not have the household resources to sustain local ECD sites in a sustainable manner.” (Page 20)

The only funding, for this category of ECD is the DSD funding for food, in situations of extreme poverty (to sites for parents who earn less than R 1800 per month). The funding flows through province.

Gaps, opportunities and challenges identified in the Action Plan iro ECD

The Action Plan identifies a number of challenges:
Intergovernmental coordination

Under qualified ECD practitioners (improving the quality of practitioners places the emphasis on quality rather than quantity of jobs).

Limited accredited training service providers.

Slow registration of sites. DSD intends to embark on a registration drive of NPOs to speed up the registration of sites. (give brief indication of what registration entails here – Maurice?)

Funding – there has been a lack of funding to support subsidies at sites within DSD and as more sites are registered more funding will be demanded.

Capacity – within the two departments to manage the integrated plan.

Weak monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

Longer term funding possibilities from DSD for scaled up ECD programme – non-existent.

Limited resources of SETAs.

Limited ECD materials.

Training capacity. More NQF level 2 and 3 units are needed to bridge gap between level 1 and 4.

(Page 20)

HCBC and EPWP

The HCBC programme aims to create the conditions of the roll out of the Community Health Worker programme which sees the introduction of a CHW in every community of 250 households by 2010 (our own view on this ratio, is that unless the CHW is supplemented by other HCBC workers this is far too high and ratio should be much lower for the programme to have any chance of success, particularly in rural areas. Perhaps in densely settled informal settlements the ratio may be appropriate). The CHW policy framework was released by DOH in 2004.

The DOH has committed itself to recruiting 35 000 CHWs by 2010. The CHW programme (the newest of the HCBC programmes) is accorded prominence. The CHW programme aims to roll out workers with the highest levels of formal training while the other HCBC programmes will be seen as a stepping stone towards such qualifications.

The Action Plan states that the DSD funds 7 500 HCBC care-givers and has the capacity to expand its funding for a further 9 500 care-givers in 2006/7, and 10 500 in 2007/8. The DOH, the Action Plan states, has funding for 14 500 HCBC/CHW work opportunities linked to EPWP.

In this sector, implementation has focused on the unemployed (mostly volunteers) who are selected to participate in the 2 year EPWP programme and at the same time matriculants who are interested in pursuing a CHW career (page 7).

Presently there are 892 HCBC sites mostly being run by NGOs and CBOs. 356 receive some government funding which accounts for 65% of the funding requirements. The DSD provides 73% of the government funding, the DOH 23% and the remaining 2% is provided by other departments.

The total number of jobs existing in these sites is 31 565 of which 19 616 are volunteers (15 326 of these receive no allowance at all). In general, staff are poorly trained (page 14).

The Action Plan states that for the HCBC programme to meet the needs of communities the number of sites and the amount of training provided has to be increased. The expansion of HCBC, slots into the DOH desire to expand CHWs to one per 250 households (this translates into 35 000 CHWs jobs).

Gaps, opportunities and challenges identified in Action Plan iro HCBC/CHW

The Action Plan identifies a number of challenges.

Coordination between DSD and DOH. Lack of consistency between DSD and DOH programmes.
Differing rates of pay. Stipends range from R250 to R 2500.

Synchronising norms and standards.

Targeting and reach. Despite the programme many volunteers are not being paid stipends or receiving training.

Limited accredited training service providers.

Capacity – within the departments to manage the integrated plan.

Weak monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

Limited resources of SETAs.

Need to maintain volunteers and spirit of volunteerism and not raise expectations unreasonably.
(Page 23)

The Action Plan discusses what is required to create a more enabling environment for expansion.

An enabling environment – conditions for expansion of ECD and HCBC

The Action Plan makes a number of suggestions regarding the expansion under the following bullet points.

a. Institutional arrangement must be in place

National departments must develop integrated plans (including plans on how to implement programme), policy, guidelines, and make provision for funding for provinces

Provinces must identify and mobilise delivery agents, make provision for funding for them, and must develop monitoring systems

NGOs, CBOs and others must deliver

SETAs must provide learnerships

b. Communication must be used to promote success

This is essential to ensure that internal and external role players are informed and to inform the public about the programme and its achievements. The responsibility lies with line departments, although DPW will supplement it. (Page 30)

c. Programme management procedures

The Action Plan speaks about Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), principles, policies and manuals that should be developed for the programmes and sections governing EPWP components (page 31).

The need to standardise the selection of sites, learners, remuneration, management of training and the appointment of service providers is emphasised. And it is proposed that levels of remuneration must be standard. In the Action Plan NQF level 1 & 2 are priced at R500, NQF level 3 is priced at R750 and NQF level 4 is priced at R1000.

These payment levels are supposed to apply to both HCBC and ECD learnerships and must be used in all new projects.

d. Capacity Building

The training of government officials in strategic planning, project management, financial management, contract management and report writing relevant to the programme is seen as important. And training must be provided to service delivery agents in similar skills in addition to the specific training in either HCBC or ECD. Also training assessors in exit counselling is needed. (Page 32)

e. Monitoring and Evaluation

Important tasks are identified for different levels of government. For instance monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at the central level must take the form of collating provincial data, collating the total budget and reporting on EPWP expenditure as a % of the total line function budget of the three departments. DPW is meant to assist.

Provincial Departments are meant to collate data from Service Providers and districts, collate line function expenditure on sites, report on EPWP expenditure as a % of departmental expenditure, calculate total social expenditure (cost per children and site), consolidate learnerships and exist opportunities and package this as EPWP. (Page 33)

Budgets and funding flow for EPWP

Budgets and funding flows are channelled through provinces who in turn fund NGOs and CBOs (DSD).

The Action Plan states that by 2010 R1,767 billion is need to enable the HCBC/CHW programme to recruit the required capacity to roll out the programme. Only R 159 011, it says, has been secured. R 2 701 billion is needed for ECD by 2010. (this figure is quoted in the Action Plan on page 8 and page 34 – but seems inappropriately high and possibly should be R2 701 million?)

Four components of funding are identified

1. Funding for stipends to pay for participants in ECD and HCBC programmes that are part of EPWP
2. Funding for management (10% of programme funding)
3. Funding for SETAs to roll out training
4. Funding for long term employment opportunities

Comments on Action Plan – particularly on how it sees implementation

The Action Plan is a professional document but it falls short of being a detailed implementation plan. Such detail is partially addressed almost on the last page (page 38) where a table is presented which outlines the implementation challenges. The table sets out a set of challenges, actions that must be addressed and who should take them forward and by when. However the process of implementation itself is not clearly theorised or worked out. However the Action Plan provides a really useful framework for thinking about implementation and has been used as the main starting point in our analysis of what needs to be done to give further impetus and momentum to the Social Sector Plan. .

We have clustered the challenges presented in the table, and summarised the actions proposed, by whom and by when, to give an indication of the key areas that are identified by the Action Plan as requiring action, if the Plan is to be implemented.

Job creation

Creating long term posts for EPWP participants exiting ECD and HCBC programmes is seen as a challenge. Cabinet must support this and the social cluster must implement this challenge by July 2005. This challenge is addressed too vaguely in the Action Plan. The creation of long term full time jobs for people must be planned over the long term. Each line department must start presenting proposals in their budgets for new posts which indicate what level posts they are, where they are, etc. A great deal of planning and forward thinking is required at national and provincial level by each department to be able to ascertain exactly how to expand the long term opportunities of exiting participants.

Identifying opportunities for further expansion: This task must be carried out by all the departments by June 2006.

Problems with regard to sites

The limited implementation ability in HCBC/CHW is seen as a challenge caused by a shortage of sites. A specific action required to be taken, by the Department of Health is to lift the ceiling of the number of participants per province, by July 2005. Apparently, the DOH decided to limit each NGO/CBO service provider to a maximum of 60 HCBC/CHW sites in any province. The ceiling was introduced to prevent larger NGOs from dominating. Now, apparently the aim is to encourage the larger NGOs to enter into partnerships with smaller CBOs instead, and the ceiling should have been lifted. This challenge and implementation strategy is one of the more useful (in the entire table) as it identifies one department that must take action to change one blockage.

Poor registration of ECD sites: DSD is tasked with fast-tracking the registration drive by June 2006. This too is one of the more concrete proposals so it has the possibility of being implemented. The Action Plan is however silent on the question of the mobilisation of drivers to implement the action – much of the driving will have to be done at provincial level.

Problems regarding volunteers and stipends

Maximising potential of existing volunteers. Here the service providers are required to take action and enrol volunteers on learnerships. The manner in which this should be done is never discussed in the Action Plan.

Lack of standardised remuneration. The DOH and DSD are tasked with the job of standardising remuneration in the HCBC/CHW sector by March 2006.

Inadequate communication

Lack of information at provincial and NGO/CBO level about the expansion plan is identified as a challenge and a Road Show is proposed to be undertaken by July 2005 by the three responsible departments.

Problems with SETAs

Capacity to implement learnerships at scale is identified as a problem and the action proposed is for the Social Sector Cluster to develop and sign MOUs with SETAs for learnership programmes. Here, once again, an identifiable driver is not identified to take this forward. And it is not at all clear that the problem is learnership programmes as much as accredited service providers (. Another proposed action is that the provincial departments (DOE, DSD, EPWP and DOH) should prepare provincial implementation plans between departments and SETAs by August 2005. This

is an important proposal since SETAS must have a clear picture of intended provincial roll-out of the programmes if they are to be able to plan.

Finalising outstanding unit standards: The DOH, DSD and DOE, along with the SETAs are tasked with finalising the ECD and HCBC skills programme and unit standards. No date is specified by when this should happen.

Lack of ECD learning materials at sites: The DOE is specifically tasked with the job of developing ECD toolkits to support sites. The question is whether this is a national DOE or provincial DOE function?

Lack of accredited training providers: The SETAs are tasked with accelerating the accreditation and registration of training providers by December 2005.

Lack of capacity amongst training providers: The EPWP is tasked with preparing an implementing guide for training service providers by September 2005.

Coordination problems

Inadequate inter-government coordination is seen as a challenge that must be tackled by DOE, DSD and DOH by strengthening the ECD and HCBC/CHC intergovernmental forums. In our view, from our observation and interviews conducted, these forums are as strong as they are likely to be, and coordination must be looked at quite differently. And as in many other proposals made in the table, this proposal does not really give authority to any one to drive this action. The challenge was meant to be resolved by July 2005 so one must assume that the revival of the EPWP Intergovernmental Steering Committee may have been aimed at resolving this challenge.

IGR. All three departments are tasked with strengthening ECD and HCBC inter-governmental forums by July 2005.

Implementation/Programme management procedures

The lack of standardised programme management procedures is seen as a problem and the three departments plus EPWP (DPW) are tasked with developing a programme management procedures manual by August 2005. This manual should include identification and assessments of site, recruitment and placement of learners, generic procurement procedures, and programme management arrangements.

Weak M&E frameworks. All three departments are to improve M&E systems and capacity by September 2005.

Capacity issues

Lack of institutional capacity. EPWP (DPW) is tasked with having to develop a public sector training programme for ECD and HCBC programme management by December 2005.

Limited internal HR capacity at provincial level. DOH, DOE and DSD at provincial level must review capacity and recruit additional capacity by January 2006.

Limited internal HR capacity. DOE, DOH and DSD must review capacity and recruit additional capacity at national level by November 2005.

Capacity to gear up to scale. DOE, DOH and DSD must advertise and appoint service delivery providers (NGOs, CBOs) by December 2005.

Funding

Increased demand for ECD DSD subsidies. DSD and Treasury are meant to expand the funding base and subsidy programme by March 2006.

Limited funding to roll out training. The Department of Labour, the SETAs and Treasury are tasked with expanding funding to address identified training targets by March 2006.

The reason we have given so much attention to the Table in the Action Plan is that it identifies urgent actions required to accelerate expansion, and is, in a sense the last official word on the matter, having been published in May this year. Our work has to build upon, revisit, expand and interpret the work that has gone before us, and the Action Plan represents the last significant document of note. Notwithstanding some weaknesses, it does identify many blockages that we ourselves have identified, and does form a good starting point for our work, which takes many of the issues somewhat further.

Annexure 3:

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

During the course of the project we have conducted interviews with a range of officials at all three spheres of government, employees of SETAs, NGOs and other key informants. These are listed below.

Interviews were conducted with the following –

National Government

Vuyelwa Nhlapo – DG Social Development

Mohamed Hassen - Office of the Presidency

Dr P. Mahlathi - DDG Health

Gugu Gumede - Chief Director, Human Resources, Health

Themba Fosi - Department of Local Government, Inter-governmental Relations Director, 2nd September 2005

Julia De Bruyn - Treasury, 23rd August, 2005

Mark Bletcher – Treasury

Oupa Ramachela – Department of Social Development (3 interviews)

Jean Msiza—Department of Public Works (several consultations)

Sean Philips – Department of Public Works

Conrad Jardine- Service Provider to DPW

Jacque Boule (2 interviews) Service Provider to DPW (key formulator of Social Sector Plan)

SETAs

Dr Govender - Health and Welfare SETA, 18th August 2005

Sibongile Sibiya - Education Training and Development Practices SETA, Manager of ECD, 15th September 2005

Provincial Government

Sduduzo Simelane - Provincial Director : EPWP KwaZulu Natal

Sthembile Ronald Magagula- Coordinator of Social Sector Plan, Northern Cape, 15th September 2005

Maisy Masekoa - Free State Province, Designation Director, Developmental Social Services, Department of Social Development, 14th September 2005.

Thandi Motlonyanye—Mpumalanga

N. Mavusha- Limpopo

Christine Quickfall - Director Development Social Service, Acting Provincial Coordinator for Social Sector EPWP, Western Cape, 16th September 2005.

Avasha Gopaulsingh - Department of Social Development, EPWP Coordinator, KZN, 6th October 2005.

Municipalities

Dr J Dyer - Msunduzi Municipality, 15th July 2005.

NGOs

Nomsa Shembe - Manager : Social sector, Ink Project, (When?)

Leonard Saul - SA Congress for Early Childhood Development, 15th July 2005.

Eric Atmore - Centre for Early Childhood Development, Cape Town, 22nd August 2005

Zeni Thumbadoo - National Association of Child Care Workers, (NACCW), 7th September 2005.

Sane Ndlovu - Attic, Pietermaritzburg, 18th October 2005.

Sam Dlamini - South Africa Health Care Organisation (SAHECO), 7th September 2005.

Kenneth Ndlovu - Msunduzi Hospice, 26th August 2005.

Stellar Zulu - Children in Distress Network, (CINDI), 14th July 2005.

Yugi Nair - Project Coordinator, HIVAN, HIV/AIDS Networking NGO, based at University of KZN, 7th September 2005.

Judith Streak - IDASA, Senior Economist, Children's Budget Unit, 6th October 2005.

Cees Benedyk - South African Health Care Organisation (SAHECO), KZN, 6th October 2005.

Other

Renette Du Toit . HSRC

Peter Netshipale. European Union

Marion Stewart. Shisaka

Alan Campbell. Shisaka

Jane Kvalsig. Service provider to HSRC

Kathy Southgate. Consultant in the Health sector.

Annexure 4:

MEETINGS ATTENDED

The following departmental meetings were attended by the Consultant Team

Social Sector Meeting with Business Trust team, 18th July 2005 - attended by officials from EPWP, DSD, DOE, DOH and the Business Trust

DSD Meeting, 26th July 2005 - attended by officials from Office of the Rights of the Child, DPW, DSD and EPWP.

HCBC Interdepartmental Steering Committee, 8th August, 2005 - attended by officials from DOH and DSD

ECD Interdepartmental Steering Committee, 12th August 2005 - attended by officials from DOE and DSD

EPWP National Interdepartmental Steering Committee, 17th September 2005 – attended by officials from DOE, DSD, DOH and EPW

Annexure 5:

SOURCE DOCUMENTS

Expanded Public Works Programme, Social Sector Plan, 2004/5 – 2008/9, Prepared by the Department of Social Development, the Department of Education and the Department of Health, 16th March 2004.

ECD and HCBC/CHW Employment Expansion Action Plan, 17th May 2005

HW SETA – HWSETA Processes, requirements and plans for HCBC and CHW programmes, Compiled by Mrs. Blosson Rantloane

Institutional Arrangements : National – Policy and Programme Management, Attachment to September 2005 Report of EPWP National Interdepartmental Steering Committee.

A National Framework for Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa – Department of Provincial and Local Government and the Governance and Administration Cluster, Version 30 February, 2004

Intergovernmental Relations Framework Bill – B 3B – 2005

A Critical Evaluation of Training and Skills Development in the Expanded Public Works Programme – Anna McCord, SALDRU, University of Cape Town, Journal of Vocational and Educational Training, Vol. 57 (4), 2005.

Briefing Document for the Deputy President – Expanded Public Works Programme, 30 June 2005

Social Sector Progress Report – Expanded Public Works Programme, November 2004